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1. INTRODUCTION
The article discusses an issue of extension of arbitration agreements to non-
signatories, which involves spanning their scope over entities that have never signed 
them1. The problem has been frequently analysed by foreign practice and arbitral 
tribunals. However, in Poland that tenet seems to be fairly unexplored and there is 
still a need for a wide discussion on the topic and potential directions of its evolu-
tion. Apart from a series of articles and chapters of monographs, there is a paucity 
of more complex and coherent analysis of the phenomenon, although it is an ex-
tremely interesting problem. An answer to the question of who is really bound by 
an arbitration agreement or could be bound in the future, except for the actual parties 
to the agreement, is crucial. Nevertheless, the forthcoming analysis must be pre-
ceded by a couple of overall remarks. 
According to the prevailing opinion among scholars, arbitration itself relies 
upon parties’ consent2. The purpose of an arbitration agreement is to refer a dispute 
that could arise between parties to an impartial institution or a person chosen by 
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1 W.W. Park: Arbitration of International Business Disputes. Studies in Law and Practice, 2nd ed., Oxford 2012, 
p. 297; J.M. Hosking: Non-Signatories and International Arbitration in the United States: the Quest for Consent, 
Arbitration International 2004, Vol. 20, No. 3, p. 289. 
2 G.B. Born: International Commercial Arbitration, Vol. 1, 2nd ed., Kluwer Law International 2014, pp. 1408–
1409; M.L. Moses: The Principles and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, Cambridge University 




Transformacje Prawa Prywatnego 4/2018
them at the same time excluding a trial before a common (state) court. The arbitra-
tion agreement can be drawn up as an agreement concluded after the dispute has 
arisen (in Poland it is mandatory in the case of employment or consumer disputes) 
or before the prospective dispute. Under Article 1161 § 1 of the Polish Code of 
Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as PCCP)3, in an arbitration agreement the 
parties must indicate the subject of a dispute or at least a legal relationship from 
which the dispute may arise or has arisen. Thus, arbitration agreement always refers 
to some other contractual relationship. Hence, it can be shaped as an arbitration 
clause — an additional stipulation in the main contract concluded between parties, 
or it can also be an additional, separate agreement which refers to the main contract. 
Such a distinction is rather important regarding the topic of this publication because 
the extension of arbitration agreement to non-signatories concerns rather arbitration 
clauses. For the purpose of this article, the author shall use the following notions: 
“arbitration clause”, “arbitration agreement”, “main contract”, “underlying contract” 
or “container contract”4. The term of arbitration clause shall refer to an additional, 
contractual provision in a container contract. The term of arbitration agreement 
shall be used if the author does not want to make a particular distinction between 
arbitration clauses and separate arbitration agreements. Additionally, the notions 
of container contract, underlying contract or main contract shall be used interchange-
ably to describe contracts which the arbitration agreement is referring to. The 
concept of the extension of arbitration agreement to non-signatories firstly has been 
worked out by a practice of international commercial arbitration. The aim of the 
concept is to extend the scope of the binding effect of arbitration agreements to 
persons who have not signed them5. The justification of that scheme is rooted in 
a relationship of such persons to one of the contractual parties or a relationship to 
the main contract itself (i.e. by performing its part). Consequently, such a third 
party, regardless of whether as a claimant or as a defendant, might be also a party 
to further arbitration proceedings6. 
The application of that scheme differs in various jurisdictions. Furthermore, 
some of the grounds for extending the scope of an arbitration agreement have been 
questioned by some jurisdictions7. Until now, courts from common law jurisdictions 
3 Act of 17 November 1964 — Code of Civil Procedure (Journal of Laws of 1964, No. 46, item 296). 
4 The notion: “container contract” is widely accepted by American scholars; cf.: J. Carter, J. Fellas (eds.): In-
ternational Commercial Arbitration in New York, New York 2010, p. 139; E. Brunet, R.E. Speidel, J. Sternlight, 
S.J. Ware (eds.): Arbitration Law in America, A Critical Assessment, New York 2006, pp. 96–97; J. Graves, 
Y. Davydan: Competence-Competence and Separability — American Style [in:] S. Kröll, L.A. Mistelis, P. Perales 
Viscasillas, V. Rogers (eds.), International Arbitration and International Commercial Law. Synergy, Convergence 
and Evolution, Kluwer Law International 2011, p. 176. Therefore, it shall also be used hereinafter.
5 M.L. Moses: The Principles…, op. cit., pp. 34–35.
6 T. Várady, J.J. Barceló III, A.T. von Mehren: International Commercial Arbitration. A Transnational Perspec-
tive, 5th ed., West 2012, p. 212.
7 O. Sandrock: Arbitration Agreements and Groups of Companies, The International Lawyer 1993, Vol. 27, 
No. 4, pp. 941–942.
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have developed the following bases: implied consent, agency, third-party beneficiary, 
equitable estoppel, veil piercing doctrine. Some of jurisdictions (e.g. Switzerland), 
instead of veil piercing doctrine, deeply rooted in the common law culture, apply 
some equivalent bases such as an abuse of rights. It has been pointed out that also 
an incorporation by reference is a basis for extending a personal scope of the arbitra-
tion agreement to non-signatories. In that case, a third party can be bound by the 
arbitration agreement though the contract which has been signed does not contain 
an arbitration clause. Instead of that, its content refers to another document in which 
the arbitration agreement has been placed (i.e. when the contract refers to a standard 
form contract)8. In common law as well as in civil law countries it has been widely 
acknowledged that an arbitration agreement can be transferred through a legal suc-
cession (i.e. through a merger of companies), an assignment, subrogation or an as-
sumption of a debt. Apart from the aforementioned ones, arbitral tribunals have 
developed also a group of companies doctrine9. Commentators point out that the last 
one has been specifically worked out in the international arbitration context. 
Theorists propose to divide the aforesaid bases into two categories. The first 
category should encompass the following: implied consent, agency, equitable estop-
pel, third-party beneficiary, incorporation by reference. Such bases would be governed 
by the principles of contract law. First and foremost, it must be said that these rules 
concern mainly the contract law principles existing in common law countries, there-
fore, some of the aforementioned legal institutions do not have to fit in with Polish 
statutory solutions, especially law of obligations. Additionally, it is worth mention-
ing that, as the prevailing opinion in foreign jurisprudence specifies, the arbitration 
agreement should be deemed a contractual construct10. Apart from the aforementioned 
grounds, the doctrine also invokes a legal succession, an assignment, an assumption 
of debt11, which are also typical, contractual institutions. The second category would 
encompass veil piercing doctrine as a construct typical of corporate law (lex so-
cietatis)12. Furthermore, as it shall be explained hereinafter, the group of companies 
should fall within the scope of the first group as a contractual basis. Although 
its name could suggest that it has strong implications towards corporate law, as 
B. Hanotiau notices, the whole doctrine is “a shortcut to avoid legal reasoning”. 
However, its main purpose is to determine real parties to the contract through inten-
8 M.L. Moses: The Principles…, op. cit., p. 35; J.M. Hosking: Non-Signatories…, op. cit., p. 290; Ł. Błaszczak, 
M. Ludwik: Sądownictwo Polubowne (Arbitraż) [Arbitration], Warsaw 2007, pp. 115–116.
9 M.L. Moses: The Principles…, op. cit., pp. 35–36; N. Blackaby, J.M. Hunter, C. Partasides, A. Redfern: 
Redfern and Hunter on International Commercial Arbitration, Oxford University Press 2015, pp. 85–91; Zurich 
Am. Ins. Co. v. Watts Industries Inc., 417 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 2005) (USA).
10 L.L. Fuller: Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator [in:] M.L. Kahn (ed.), Collective Bargaining and 
the Arbitrator’s Role, Proceedings of the 15th Annual Meeting, National Academy of Arbitrators 29, Washington 
D.C. 1962, p. 14.
11 J.M. Hosking: Non-Signatories…, op. cit., p. 290.
12 W.W. Park: Arbitration…, op. cit., pp. 298–299.
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tions inferred from the parties’ conduct, what makes it a consent-based theory13. 
Resultantly, as it is premised on a concept stemming from its consensual nature, 
it has been rated among contractual bases having their origins in contract law. 
B. Hanotiau criticizes an idea of treating the group of companies doctrine as a sep-
arate theory14. Beside the aforesaid categories of the grounds stemming from cor-
porate or contract law, other scholars propose a different methodology of categoriza-
tion. G.B. Born makes a distinction regarding consensual and nonconsensual 
character of such bases. As he notices, the first category includes purely consen-
sual theories (i.e. agency, assignment) and the second category contains nonconsensual 
theories (i.e. estoppel, veil piercing) focusing more on equity and fairness15.
Moreover, some scholars point to corporate disputes involving officers or direc-
tors as possibly constituting grounds for the extension of the arbitration clause16. 
Such a problem mainly concerns arbitration clauses placed in articles of association 
or corporate by-laws. This poses a question of whether such an arbitration clause 
can bind corporate officers or directors in the event of corporate disputes among 
shareholders or between shareholders and the company, although the officers have 
not signed it, just because they hold down managerial positions in the company. 
Furthermore, because this article has a limited scope, it shall not discuss the matter 
of investment arbitration, between a hosting state and a foreign investor under Bi-
lateral Investment Treaties (BITs). It will not concern a problem of class actions and 
class arbitrations, either.
Often, the extension of an arbitration agreement to non-signatories from the 
perspective of international commercial arbitration has been justified with regard to 
a sense of justice or good morals. For instance, when labour rights, human rights or 
environmental issues are at stake17. Especially, there is a prevailing opinion that in 
the realm of international trade, huge corporations operate through their subsidiaries, 
over which they mostly have absolute control18. The situation, e.g. where only 
a subsidiary that entered into the main contract with arbitration clause is brought 
before an arbitration panel, while a parent company performing overwhelming 
control over that subsidiary at the time of conclusion of such a contract avoids 
the arbitration, raises serious questions of the effectiveness of the whole system. On 
the other hand, in international commercial arbitration, the consent to arbitration is 
13 B. Hanotiau: Consent to Arbitration: Do we Share a Common Vision?, Arbitration International 2011, No. 4, 
p. 546. 
14 Ibidem.
15 G.B. Born: International…, op. cit., p. 1418. 
16 Ibidem, pp. 1477–1480. 
17 Y. Kryvoi: Piercing the Corporate Veil in International Arbitration, Global Business Law Review 2011, Vol. 1, 
No. 169, pp. 173–174.
18 R. Daujotas: Non-Signatories and Abuse of Corporate Structure in International Commercial Arbitration, 
International Economic Law eJournal 2012, Vol. 7, No. 78, pp. 2–3; J. Ruggie: Protect, Respect and Remedy: 
A Framework for Business and Human Rights, Innovations, Spring 2008, p. 191; H. Holtzman, J. Neuhaus: A Guide 
to the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, Kluwer 1994, p. 300.
Transformacje Prawa Prywatnego 4/2018
27
fundamental19 and forcing third parties to arbitrate, where their will to arbitrate is 
not that obvious, might challenge an axiological mainstay which lies beneath such 
a method of dispute resolution20. Commentators and some arbitration tribunals 
identify at least some of the aforesaid bases for the extension of arbitration agree-
ments with international trade usage and peculiar lex mercatoria. That is also a se-
rious pattern in a wide debate over a transnational nature of international arbitration 
and its legal sources in the context of lex mercatoria21. 
Nevertheless, there is a wide discussion pending over the role of consent in 
international commercial arbitration (B. Hanotiau22, A. Steingruber23, S. Brekou-
lakis24). Some scholars suggest that a role of consent as a fundamental prerequisite 
in international commercial arbitration has been recently decreased. Some also 
propose alternative solutions, e.g. through replacing a requirement of consent with 
an overall assessment of case facts and real impact which a potential arbitral award 
might have on third persons’ interests involved in the dispute (the non-signatories’ 
interests). This would mean that the subjective features (parties’ intensions) could 
be diminished for the benefit of the objective ones (i.e. parties’ involvement in 
a dispute, economic reality, procedural effectiveness, etc.). A. Steingruber indicates 
that a term “consent” has a lot of meanings such as: a consensual act, a permission, 
or an agreement. Therefore, although the arbitration is premised on parties’ consent, 
it does not mean that the parties must enter into an arbitration agreement (arbitration 
clause). 
Furthermore, the tenet should also be analysed with respect to a problem of the 
form of an arbitration agreement. In many jurisdictions, it is mandatory to draw up 
an arbitration agreement in writing, otherwise it is null or ineffective25. Meanwhile, 
the extension of the scope of an arbitration agreement to entities that have not signed 
the contract might violate such a requirement26. Contrarily, some other jurisdictions 
seem to loosen up the requirements regarding the form of an arbitration agreement27. 
Nevertheless, it must be said that the written form does not have to mean an agree-
ment signed by both parties. In Poland, the written form is practically tantamount 
19 G.B. Born: International…, op. cit., pp. 1408–1409. 
20 S. Sołtysiński: Związanie zapisem na sąd polubowny i orzeczeniem arbitrażowym członków zgrupowania 
spółek, ich wspólników i interesariuszy [Binding effect of an arbitration agreement and arbitral awards for members 
of a group of companies, their shareholders and stakeholders], Problemy Prawa Prywatnego Międzynarodowego 
2012, No. 11, p. 13.
21 G.B. Born: International…, op. cit., p. 1493.
22 B. Hanotiau: Consent…, op. cit.
23 A.M. Steingruber: Consent in International Arbitration, Oxford 2012.
24 S. Brekoulakis: Rethinking Consent in International Commercial Arbitration: A General Theory for Non-
Signatories, Journal of International Dispute Settlement 2017, No. 8; S. Brekoulakis: Third Parties in Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitration, New York 2010. 
25 E. Gaillard, G.A. Bermann: The UNCITRAL Secretariat Guide on the Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards New York 1958, Brill Nijhoff 2017, p. 60.
26 G.B. Born: International…, op. cit., pp. 1489–1491.
27 W.W. Park: Arbitration…, op. cit., pp. 300–301; S. Sołtysiński, Związanie…, op. cit., p. 10.
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to a document signed by both parties, while in other jurisdictions the written form 
does not necessarily require parties’ signatures (e.g. in Australia)28. 
In Poland, the concept that is the topic hereof seems to be still an unexplored 
tenet29. However, before analysing a possibility of applying the idea to Polish law, 
some basic assumptions must be introduced. First, it has to be decided whether an 
arbitration agreement under Polish law is a substantive law (contract law) construct30, 
or a procedural institution31. Legal provisions regulating the arbitration agreement 
are set forth among the rules of civil procedure (Article 1161 et seq. PCCP). Also, 
the consequences of a conclusion of an arbitration agreement affect merely a proce-
dural dimension. Each party can contest a common (state) court’s jurisdiction on the 
basis of an arbitration agreement. Such an objection practically prevents a state court 
from trying a case. Opposite to that, other commentators hold that an arbitration 
agreement is rather a substantive law matter, and therefore it is of a contractual na-
ture32. Most of all, the arbitration agreement is often concluded outside the trial33. 
Furthermore, the arbitration agreement cannot be withdrawn by one of the parties 
without mutual consent of both, whilst the procedural acts can be generally withdrawn 
by parties34. Deciding that crucial issue is of great importance to this article. Depend-
ing on whether the arbitration agreement is a substantive law or a procedural law 
institution, different provisions shall be applied to assess it. In the case if it is a sub-
stantive law institution, supplementarily the provisions of the Polish Civil Code35 
(hereinafter referred to as PCC) shall be applied, including those referring to contracts. 
However, if it is a procedural law construct, the PCCP provisions shall be applied 
accordingly, i.e. those regulating a joinder or an intervention in proceedings or pro-
cedural subrogation during a litigation. Additionally, regarding the fact that the 
aforesaid theories cannot be defended without any doubts, sometimes particular views 
are raised that the arbitration agreement has a mixed nature, both contractual and 
28 C. Utz [in:] J.W. Rowley (ed.), Arbitration World, 2nd ed., London 2006, p. 5. 
29 M. Tomaszewski [in:] A. Szumański (ed.), Arbitraż handlowy. System Prawa Handlowego [Commercial 
arbitration. Commercial Law System], Vol. 18, Warsaw 2015, pp. 374–375.
30 A. Budniak-Rogala: Charakter prawny zapisu na sąd polubowny w postępowaniu cywilnym [Legal nature 
of an arbitration agreement in civil proceedings], Wrocław 2015, p. 498; M. Hałgas: Charakter prawny zapisu na sąd 
polubowny [Legal nature of an arbitration agreement], Przegląd Ustawodawstwa Gospodarczego 2007, No. 7, p. 8.
31 R. Kulski: Umowy procesowe w postępowaniu cywilnym [Procedural agreements in civil proceedings], 
Zakamycze 2006, p. 167; M. Tomaszewski [in:] A. Szumański (ed.), Arbitraż…, op. cit., pp. 338–339; M. Toma-
szewski: Umowa o arbitraż. Podstawowe problemy prawne [Arbitration agreement. Basic legal issues], Przegląd 
Ustawodawstwa Gospodarczego 1994, No. 1, pp. 15–16; T. Ereciński, K. Weitz: Sąd arbitrażowy [Arbitration], 
Warsaw 2008, pp. 85–86.
32 K. Siedlik: Charakter prawny umowy arbitrażowej w prawie niemieckim i polskim [Legal nature of an ar-
bitration agreement in German and Polish law], Przegląd Ustawodawstwa Gospodarczego 2000, No. 2, pp. 20–26; 
Ł. Błaszczak: Wyrok sądu polubownego w postępowaniu cywilnym [Arbitral award in civil proceedings], Warsaw 
2010, p. 114; M. Mazur: Moc wiążąca umów procesowych na przykładzie zapisu na sąd polubowny [Effectiveness of 
procedural agreements on the example of arbitration agreement], ADR. Arbitraż i Mediacja 2011, No. 1, p. 51.
33 T. Ereciński, K. Weitz: Sąd…, op. cit., p. 81.
34 Ibidem, p. 82.
35 Act of 23 April 1964 — Civil Code (Journal of Laws of 1964 No. 16, item 93). 
Transformacje Prawa Prywatnego 4/2018
29
procedural36, or should be treated at least as a sui generis agreement37; and although 
it does not have an enforceable consideration38, the lack of which could cause damage 
to one of the parties39, it still should be evaluated accordingly through a perspective 
of substantive law provisions (particularly PCC). Scholars, regardless of the afore-
mentioned remarks, are commonly keen on accepting the fact that PCC provisions 
can be applied supplementarily to the assessment of the arbitration agreement, 
e.g. in the case of defects in a declaration of will40. Thus, for the purpose of the sub-
sequent study, the author shall adopt such an assumption. Therefore, when comparing 
the grounds for the extension of the arbitration agreement to non-signatories at the 
international level with those existing under Polish law, the author shall resort firstly 
to PCCP and then to the PCC provisions, i.e. the provisions of the substantive law. 
In addition, the author would like to point at potential threats that could arise by 
adopting the discussed theories without any reservations in Polish law. First, it is worth 
considering whether such an extension of the arbitration agreement to a third person 
would not violate their constitutional right to court (Article 45 of the Polish Constitu-
tion). Moreover, there is a question of whether an unjustified extension of the arbitra-
tion agreement scope would not induce a serious flaw of an arbitral award issued on 
the basis of such an agreement41 or whether as a matter of public policy (i.e. protection 
of the third party’s right to court) such an award, when foreign, would be still enforce-
able in Poland. Such deliberations shall also be covered by this publication. In the 
end, the author shall sum up his analysis and try to draw some conclusions.
2. EXTENSION OF THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT  
TO NON-SIGNATORIES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
At the beginning, the possibility of extending the arbitration agreement to non-
signatories appeared in arbitral awards issued in international commercial disputes. 
First, the spotlight must be turned on the arbitral award in case Dow Chemical42, 
36 R. Kuratowski: Sądownictwo polubowne [Arbitration], Warsaw 1932, p. 24; S. Dalka: Sądownictwo polu-
bowne w PRL [Arbitration in the Polish People’s Republic], Warsaw 1987, pp. 56–57; W. Siedlecki: Postępowanie 
cywilne. Zarys wykładu [Civil proceedings. An outline], Warsaw 1987, pp. 479–480.
37 M. Pazdan: Prawo właściwe dla oceny zapisu na sąd polubowny [Governing law for evaluation of an arbi-
tration agreement], Rejent 2003, No. 10, p. 176.
38 A. Wiśniewski: Międzynarodowy arbitraż handlowy w Polsce [International commercial arbitration in 
Poland], Warsaw 2011, pp. 314–315.
39 R. Kulski: Umowy procesowe…, op. cit., p. 174.
40 Ł. Błaszczak, M. Ludwik: Sądownictwo…, op. cit., pp. 86–87; T. Ereciński, K. Weitz: Sąd…, op. cit., p. 81; 
R. Kulski: Umowy procesowe…, op. cit., p. 156; W. Siedlecki: Postępowanie…, op. cit., p. 480; M. Tomaszewski 
[in:] A. Szumański (ed.), Arbitraż…, op. cit., p. 339.
41 Ł. Błaszczak, M. Ludwik: Sądownictwo…, op. cit., p. 278.
42 Dow Chemical France et al. v. ISOVER Saint Gobain (France), ICC Award No. 4131/1982 (interim award), 
9 YCA (1984) 131.
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rendered by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) panel. The award issued 
in that case has been widely cited by the majority of practitioners dealing with in-
ternational commercial arbitration as an example of extension of arbitration agree-
ment on the basis of a group of companies doctrine43. The arbitration panel empha-
sized that the doctrine is a part of international trade usage, peculiar lex mercatoria. 
However, the award also reached some other conclusions that should be pointed out. 
First and foremost, the group of companies doctrine was not a sole basis to span the 
scope of the arbitration agreement. It was tied up with other factors, such as a par-
ticipation of third parties belonging to the same group of companies in the conclusion 
and performance of the main contract. Furthermore, the non-signatories as group 
members wanted to extend the arbitration agreement’s scope to themselves and 
consequently participate in the arbitration proceedings, which, under normal cir-
cumstances, they would not have attended44. 
G.B. Born specifies that in the case of extending the arbitration agreement’s 
scope, the purpose is to determine real parties’ intent, what means both: intent of 
formal parties to the main contract and of a non-signatory to it45. W.W. Park uses 
a term: “less than obvious party” to describe non-signatories46. Grounds such as an 
agency or a group of companies doctrine aim to determine whether the non-signa-
tory was willing to be a party to the contract by their participation in its performance, 
and whether the actual parties to the contract thought that the non-signatory was 
a quasi-party to it. The will to be bound by arbitration clause does not have to nec-
essarily appear at a stage of a contract conclusion. It can come up at a subsequent 
level, i.e. through the performance or termination of the contract. However, simple 
participation in performance of some exact and limited part of the contract without 
additional factors would not extend the arbitration agreement47.
As it has been stated previously, international commercial practice following 
common law jurisprudence has developed the following grounds, sometimes differ-
ently identified (named), that could be the basis for extension of arbitration agree-
ments to non-signatories: an agency, a third-party beneficiary, an equitable estoppel, 
an implied consent, a veil piercing, an incorporation by reference, a legal succession, 
an assignment, subrogation, an assumption (acquisition) of a debt48, as well as the 
most controversial: the group of companies doctrine. Some admit that also a joint 
and several liability (i.e. a surety or a guarantee) might extend an arbitration clause 
43 G.B. Born: International…, op. cit., pp. 1493–1494.
44 T. Várady, J.J. Barceló III, A.T. von Mehren: International…, op. cit., p. 221.
45 G.B. Born: International…, op. cit., p. 1415.
46 W.W. Park: Arbitration…, op. cit., p. 298.
47 G.B. Born: International…, op. cit., p. 1428; T. Várady, J.J. Barceló III, A.T. von Mehren: International…, 
op. cit., p. 221.
48 M.L. Moses: The Principles…, op. cit., pp. 34–35; T. Várady, J.J. Barceló III, A.T. von Mehren: Interna-
tional…, op. cit., p. 219; The Rice Company (Suisse), S.A. v. Precious Flowers Ltd., 523 F.3d 528, 536 (5th Cir. 
2008) (USA); Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Government of Turkmenistan, 345 F.3d 347, 358 (5th Cir. 2003) (USA).
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to non-signatories, however, the prevailing majority of scholars is rather sceptical 
about such an idea pointing out that a surety’s liability is independent of a main debt, 
therefore as an obligation vis-à-vis the main one it cannot be a basis for establishing 
an arbitral panel’s jurisdiction over the non-signatory. The problem shall be discussed 
hereinafter. The purpose of the dissertation is not to describe the aforesaid grounds in 
detail, because it has been (and still is) a domain of international arbitration practition-
ers. However, for the purpose of this publication it is necessary to describe them 
roughly, and then compare them with current solutions worked out under Polish law. 
Agency rests upon a theory that a person who has concluded a main contract 
and an arbitration agreement acts as an agent of another person, who is supposed to 
be a principal in this case49. Nevertheless, the circumstances of each case must in-
dicate that the agent operates within a scope of their authorization. Some jurisdictions 
(e.g. in the USA) point to the concept of apparent authority, where the principal’s 
conduct can mislead a third person to a false impression that agent operates not only 
on their own behalf but also on behalf of the principal50. A fairly similar solution is 
known in French law as mandat apparent51. 
Nonetheless, the assessment of the situation and its circumstances, and making 
a decision on whether the principal can be really bound by an arbitration agreement 
on the basis of apparent authority requires to balance between some interests52. In 
the context of binding effect of the arbitration agreement on third parties, the 
agency doctrine is often invoked as a substitute of veil piercing and justification of 
extension of an arbitration agreement to companies operating in one holding group 
(a group of companies). On the one hand, the concept of apparent authority is sup-
ported by the need for certainty in professional bargain between entrepreneurs, where 
a third party’s expectations rely on a false impression that they deal not only with 
the agent but also with the principal53. On the other hand, the concept can be overused 
and therefore let to span the scope of an arbitration agreement to entities that could 
at least expect to be a party to arbitration proceedings.
The next ground for the extension of an arbitration clause to non-signatories is 
an equitable estoppel, a well-recognized legal doctrine, which can be invoked to 
preclude parties from denying that they are party to arbitration (or other) agreements54. 
In civil law countries similar conceptions operate under the notions of good faith, 
abuse of right, or venire contra factum proprium55. Generally, the doctrine means 
49 G.B. Born: International…, op. cit., p. 1419; J.M. Hosking: Non-Signatories…, op. cit., p. 292.
50 Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.03 (2006); R.W. Hamilton, J.R. Macey, D.K. Moll: Cases and Materials 
on Corporations Including Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 11th ed., West 2010, p. 24.
51 G.B. Born: International…, op. cit., p. 1424; M.L. Moses: The Principles…, op. cit., p. 36.
52 M.L. Moses: The Principles…, op. cit., p. 36; O. Sandrock: Arbitration…, op. cit., p. 942; W.W. Park: Ar-
bitration…, op. cit., p. 298.
53 G.B. Born: International…, op. cit., p. 1426.
54 Ibidem, p. 1472; M.L. Moses: The Principles…, op. cit., p. 37.
55 G.B. Born: International…, op. cit., p. 1473; S. Sołtysiński: Związanie…, op. cit., p. 27.
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that a party is barred from acting inconsistently with their own previous statements 
or conduct due to considerations of equity56. Commentators divide the circum-
stances under which the doctrine can be applied in two categories, depending on 
whether the non-signatory gains direct benefits from the contract. The first category 
covers the circumstances that indicate interrelations of contracts (intertwined issues). 
As an example, some practitioners point to a chain of contracts (also web-type con-
tracts, string contracts, etc.)57. It refers to the situation where one contract containing 
an arbitration clause is functionally related to another contract which does not have 
an arbitration clause (i.e. if contracts are entered into within the scope of one con-
struction project, and only the contract between an investor and a general contractor 
contains an arbitration clause, whilst the contract with a subcontractor does not 
contain any)58. The party to that second contract (who is a non-signatory to the ar-
bitration clause) could demand to join arbitration proceedings by invoking the arbi-
tration clause in the first one. The scholars emphasize, however, that if a party to the 
arbitration clause wanted to use it against a non-signatory, it would be impossible59. 
Thus, scholars and courts differentiate the legal situation of signatories and non-
signatories, depending on who is demanding that the scope of the arbitration agree-
ment be extended. The signatory could not demand the extension of the scope to the 
non-signatory invoking as a solely basis the interrelations of contracts60, nonetheless, 
this could work in opposite directions. When discussing the problem of intertwined 
contracts, it must be mentioned that they have to be inextricably intertwined. The 
second category encompasses situations, where the non-signatory, apart from the 
interrelation of contracts, gains a direct benefit from the main contract containing 
an arbitration clause. If so, the difference in a legal position of the signatory and the 
non-signatory would not matter. They could invoke the arbitration clause in both 
directions61. 
The difference between positions of the non-signatory and the signatory when 
demanding the extension of an arbitration agreement was an issue in case Thomson-
CSF 62. The American federal court held that such a difference is justified in the case 
of intertwined disputes. The scholars point out that the reason for such a difference 
stems from the fact that the signatory to an arbitration agreement can predict that at 
some point they shall be a party to arbitration proceedings, regardless of who will 
be a counterparty. A third person does not have such knowledge and cannot predict 
56 G.B. Born: International…, op. cit., pp. 1472–1473. 
57 S. Brekoulakis: Third Parties…, op. cit., pp. 84–85. 
58 S. Brekoulakis: Parties in International Arbitration: Consent vs Commercial Reality [in:] S. Brekoulakis, 
J.D.M. Lew et al. (eds.), The Evolution and Future of International Arbitration, Kluwer Law International 2016, 
pp. 131–132. 
59 M.L. Moses: The Principles…, op. cit., p. 37. 
60 J.M. Hosking: Non-Signatories…, op. cit., p. 291.
61 M.L. Moses: The Principles…, op. cit., p. 37; American Bureau of Shipping v. Tencara Shipyard S.P.A., 170 
F.3d 349, 353 (2nd Cir. 1999) (USA).
62 Thomson-CSF S.A. v. American Bar Association, 64 F.3d 779 (2nd Cir. 1995) (USA).
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such consequences because of the interrelation between contracts, and resultantly 
they are unable to predict that they could be bound by an arbitration agreement 
contained in a contract which they have not signed. Thus, in this case, the third 
person should get an advantage over the signatory63. Also, it is worth noting that in 
case Dow Chemical the non-signatories were claimants and those demanding the 
span of the arbitration agreement to themselves. The idea reflects one of the most 
fundamental principles existing in international commercial arbitration: legitimate 
expectations of the parties. Foreseeability of a proper interpretation of the contract 
provisions, pursued by arbitrators, is therefore of great importance64. 
Some practitioners, however, question the aforesaid standpoint claiming that 
differentiating the position of the parties depending on who is demanding the exten-
sion of an arbitration agreement, whether it is the signatory or the non-signatory, in 
the case of complicated, cross-border disputes does not have to match a reality of 
modern international trade65. It is a pattern worth consideration. Especially that in 
the international trade practice there are often many interrelated contracts con-
cluded between parties, where the role of third persons is significant enough that 
they should be also brought before an arbitration panel66. The possibility of having 
all disputes stemming from interrelated contracts, where just some of them contained 
the arbitration clause, tried by one arbitral panel would make the system of disputes 
settlement more effective67. On the other hand, binding a third person with an arbi-
tration agreement without their consent could be treated as an abuse of the third 
person’s right to court which is often guaranteed by constitutional provisions (e.g. in 
Poland).
The aforesaid basis regarding direct benefits from the contract seems to be 
closely related to the next one: the concept of a third-party beneficiary. As scholars 
notice, a third party who gains benefits from a main contract should be bound by an 
arbitration agreement (arbitration clause). Such a theory is supported by a belief that 
a non-signatory who benefits from the main contract cannot avoid its burdens, 
i.e. a method of dispute resolution. Given that, if a third party can pursue a claim 
towards parties to the contract under its provisions, the third party will be bound 
also by the arbitration clause. Resultantly, the third party is entitled to launch claims 
stemming from the contract only before the arbitral panel. G.B. Born makes a clear 
distinction between direct and indirect benefits. Only the first ones would oblige 
63 W.W. Park: Arbitration…, op. cit., pp. 309–310.
64 P. Lalive: Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy and International Arbitration [in:] P. Sanders 
(ed.), Comparative Arbitration Practice and Public Policy in Arbitration, ICCA Congress Series, Vol. 3, Kluwer 
Law International 1987, pp. 304–305.
65 G.B. Born: International…, op. cit., p. 1416; T. Várady, J.J. Barceló III, A.T. von Mehren: International…, 
op. cit., p. 221. 
66 P.J. Martinez-Fraga: The Dilemma of Extending International Commercial Arbitration Clauses to Third 
Parties: Is Protecting Federal Policy While Accommodating Economic Globalization a Bridge to Nowhere?, Cor-
nell International Law Journal 2013, Vol. 46, pp. 315–317.
67 W.W. Park: Arbitration…, op. cit., p. 298.
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a non-signatory to refer to arbitration68. Generally, direct benefits for a non-signa-
tory will be stipulated in the contact or stem from it, whilst indirect benefits would 
result e.g. from tort law or will be an effect of a statutory provision69. At this point, 
it is worth drawing attention to the British statutory solutions. Under provisions of 
the Contracts (Right of Third Parties) Act 199970 (Section 8), in case a third party 
gains direct benefits from a main contract, and all disputes resulting from that con-
tract should be arbitrated, such a third party shall be treated as a party to an arbitra-
tion agreement and, consequently, as a party to arbitration proceedings. Therefore, 
British legislature decided to stick to a third-party beneficiary rule as the basis for 
extension of the arbitration agreement to non-signatories71. 
Moreover, some jurisdictions point to the implied consent as a basis for exten-
sion of the arbitration agreement to non-signatories. A third party can be bound by 
the arbitration agreement by their conduct that could indicate their will to be a par-
ty to the main contract and thus to the arbitration agreement, e.g. by performing the 
main contract in its entirety or in part72. Nevertheless, also actual parties to that 
agreement must manifest their implied acceptance of the third party’s presence in 
their contractual relationship73. That theory is universal and widely adopted in com-
mon law countries, however, its application mostly depends on the facts of each 
case. The theorists, for example, as a ground for application of that concept point to 
a third party’s participation in arbitration proceedings and participation in arbitrators’ 
nomination, although there has been no arbitration agreement74.
The aforesaid theories refer to traditional common law contract principles. 
These grounds for extending the scope of arbitration agreements are aimed at deter-
mining a real content of contractual relationship among parties75. One can put forward 
a thesis that up to some extent such grounds are aimed at preventing contractual 
inequality between parties, especially when one entity that directly benefits from the 
contract does not want to bear the encumbrances resulting therefrom. Furthermore, 
it is widely accepted that the arbitration agreement can be spanned by means of 
a reference to another document (incorporation by reference)76. The arbitration 
68 G.B. Born: International…, op. cit., p. 1474; Thomson-CSF S.A. v. American Bar Association, 64 F.3d 779 
(2nd Cir. 1995) (USA).
69 A. Badia: Piercing the Veil of State Enterprises in International Arbitration, Kluwer Law International 2014, 
p. 99.
70 Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act of 1999, 11th November.
71 J.M. Hosking: Non-Signatories…, op. cit., p. 291; A. Tweeddale: Arbitration under the Contracts (Right of 
Third Parties) Act 1999 and Enforcement of an Award, Arbitration International 2011, Vol. 27, No. 4, p. 656; 
N. Andrews: Strangers to Justice no Longer: The Reversal of the Privity Rule under the Contracts (Rights of Third 
Parties) Act 1999, Cambridge Law Journal 2001, Vol. 60, No. 2, pp. 362–363.
72 W.W. Park: Arbitration…, op. cit., p. 298.
73 G.B. Born: International…, op. cit., p. 1427; M.L. Moses: The Principles…, op. cit., pp. 37–38.
74 B. Hanotiau: Complex Arbitrations: Multiparty, Multicontract, Multi-issue and Class Actions, Kluwer Law 
International 2006, p. 165; Gvozdenovic v. United Air Lines, Inc., 933 F.2d 1105 (2nd Cir. 1991) (USA).
75 J.M. Hosking: Non-Signatories…, op. cit., p. 302.
76 T. Várady, J.J. Barceló III, A.T. von Mehren: International…, op. cit., p. 219.
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agreement by reference means that the arbitration clause is contained in a separate 
and pre-existing document (i.e. standard form contracts) to which the parties’ contract 
refers77. Under Article 7(6) of UNCITRAL Model Law of 1985, amended in 2006, 
the reference in a contract to any document containing an arbitration clause consti-
tutes an arbitration agreement in writing, provided that the reference is such as to 
make that clause part of the contract. Most countries which adopted UNCITRAL 
Model Law require an express and specific reference to the arbitration clause78. 
Nonetheless, in other jurisdictions (e.g. in the USA) more liberal approach has been 
adopted requiring merely a general reference to the document without explicit re-
ference to the arbitration clause in the other documents79.
As commentators point out, the dominant trend in case law holds that an arbi-
tration agreement is not only valid between the parties, but it can also be relied upon 
against their heirs, their legatees, their assignees and all of those acquiring someone’s 
obligations80. For that reason, the arbitration clause will bind an assignee or a person 
who assumes someone’s debt. Many jurisdictions treat the arbitration clause as an 
ancillary right which follows a right stemming from the main contract. Some even 
opt for an automatic transfer of an arbitration agreement (e.g. the USA, Switzerland)81. 
Under many national legal systems, there are circumstances where one party may 
be subrogated to the contractual rights of another party82. This frequently occurs in 
the case of insurers, who are subrogated to the rights of the insured83. Generally, the 
insurer is entitled to invoke (and bound by) the arbitration clause of the insured’s 
main contract84. 
The theories developed on the basis of contract law principles should be com-
pared with those relating to widely-understood corporate law and liability of share-
holders and officers for company’s obligations. The author is pointing to the doctrine 
of piercing the corporate veil. The veil piercing doctrine as grounds for extending 
an arbitration clause as well as the group of companies doctrine have been deemed 
controversial by most of scholars85. Not all of jurisdictions recognize them as the 
basis for extending the scope of arbitration agreements. The practitioners usually 
use the following notions interchangeably: piercing of the corporate veil, lifting of 
the corporate veil, disregard of legal personality, etc. In Germany, for instance, it 
is known as Durchgriffshaftung. The veil piercing doctrine is mostly associated with 
77 A.M. Steingruber: Consent…, op. cit., p. 134.
78 Section 6(2) of the English Arbitration Act; section 1031(4) of the German Code of Civil Procedure. 
79 A.M. Steingruber: Consent…, op. cit., pp. 137–138.
80 G.B. Born: International…, op. cit., p. 1465; J.M. Hunter, C. Partasides, A. Redfern: Redfern…, op. cit., 
p. 89.
81 G.B. Born: International…, op. cit., p. 1467; J.M. Hunter, C. Partasides, A. Redfern: Redfern…, op. cit., 
p. 89; A.M. Steingruber: Consent…, op. cit., p. 147.
82 A.M. Steingruber: Consent…, op. cit., p. 150.
83 G.B. Born: International…, op. cit., pp. 1471–1472.
84 Ibidem.
85 Ibidem, p. 1445.
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the American legal system, while veil lifting with the British one86. Originally, it is 
a legal institution having its roots in common law which under some specific cir-
cumstances enables the scope of liability for a company’s debt to be extended to 
shareholders and officers87. What is important, a simple relation of domination be-
tween a company and a shareholder or the fact that they operate as a single eco-
nomic unit are not sufficient to apply the rule. It is necessary to prove an additional 
factor that would reflect an element of unfairness or at least some abnormalities88. 
The common law judiciary have developed the following factors as examples: an 
undercapitalization, a lack of formalities, an overlapping composition of boards of 
directors or management boards, a commingling of financial sources or properties, 
a siphoning of funds, payments to shareholders without any legal basis89. The given 
list does not exhaust all situations that could bring a liability to shareholders and 
officers for a company’s debts. In the USA such a test can vary between particular 
states. However, even if the aforementioned bases are met, the court must determine 
whether there is a fraud or any other unfairness that could harm a third person, 
e.g. a creditor, otherwise the court would not pierce the corporate veil90. Veil pierc-
ing has existed in the USA since the 1920s and has been one of the most important 
patterns in business organizations law91. Nonetheless, some scholars criticize the 
way of its application by courts. The doctrine has been used rather instinctively92. 
Moreover, commentators describe it every time in a different way using epithets and 
metaphors, such as the doctrine preventing fraud, unfairness, injustice, etc. It has 
nothing to do with legal certainty93. In the UK, the courts are not that keen on lifting 
the corporate veil, unless there is a plain proof that in the case fraud or other injus-
tice has been involved, the party seeks to avoid its obligations that have already 
existed, what could cause damage to a third party94. 
86 N. Grier: UK Company Law, Chichester–New York 1998, p. 27.
87 W.W. Park: Arbitration…, op. cit., p. 306.
88 G.B. Born: International…, op. cit., p. 1439.
89 DeWitt Truck Brokers v. W. Ray Flemming [1976], 540 F.2d at 681 (USA); Baatz v. Arrow Bar, Supreme 
Court of South Dakota, 1990, 452 N.W.2d 138 (USA); T. Várady, J.J. Barceló III, A.T. von Mehren: International…, 
op. cit., p. 220.
90 G.B. Born: International…, op. cit., p. 1436; T. Várady, J.J. Barceló III, A.T. von Mehren: International…, 
op. cit., p. 219.
91 M. Wormser: Piercing the Veil of Corporate Entity, Col.L.Rev. 1912, No. 12, pp. 496–497.
92 S. Goulding: Principles of Company Law, London 1996, p. 49; R.W. Hamilton, J.R. Macey, D.K. Moll: 
Cases…, op. cit., pp. 213–214; F.H. Easterbrook: Limited Liability and the Corporation, The University of Chi-
cago Law Review 1985, Vol. 52, p. 89.
93 V. von Wachter: The Corporate Veil, New Law Journal 2007, Vol. 157, p. 990; P.L. Blumberg: The Law of 
Corporate Groups: Procedural Problems in the Law of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations, Boston–Toronto 1983, 
p. 8.
94 Ch.S.A. Okoli: English Courts Address the Potential Convergence between Doctrines of the Corporate Veil, 
Party Autonomy in Jurisdiction Agreements and Privity of Contract, Journal of Business Law 2014, p. 252; 
S. Goulding: Principles…, op. cit., p. 51; G.B. Born: International…, op. cit., p. 1432; M.L. Moses: The Principles…, 
op. cit., p. 39.
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Afterwards, the doctrine was introduced to the realm of international com-
mercial arbitration. Generally, it is accepted to pierce a corporate veil in a pursuit 
of extending the scope of an arbitration agreement, but only when a shareholder or 
a parent company performed an overwhelming or complete control over the com-
pany at the time when the main contract and arbitration agreement were concluded 
by that company, and such a control was used to commit fraud or cause harm to an 
entity that demands veil piercing95. For example, an undercapitalized subsidiary 
which does not have sufficient financial sources from the perspective of a type of 
conducted business enters into a contract with an arbitration clause, being under 
complete domination of its parent company, and exposes the other party to a great 
loss. Afterwards it transpires that the company’s equity is not sufficient to redress 
such damage, even partially. In this case, veil piercing would rely on a claim of the 
aggrieved party that the parent company should take part in arbitration proceedings. 
W.W. Park gives an example of an entrepreneur who negotiates with the other 
party terms of the contract, and in the last minute before its conclusion convinces 
that party to enter into the contract, but with its subsidiary96.
When analysing the application of the doctrine in various jurisdictions, the 
conflicting attitudes towards the whole issue can be noticed. Some jurisdictions, 
e.g. the French one, are keen on applying the doctrine, while some other are rather 
reluctant, for instance the British one. Particular attention must be paid to two court 
decisions rendered in the same case Dallah Real Estate v. The Ministry of Religious 
Affairs, Government of Pakistan. The same arbitral award was reviewed by British97 
and French98 courts. The case facts posed a question of whether an arbitration clause 
put in the contract between Dallah Company and a trust fund under a complete 
control of the Government of Pakistan, upon the liquidation of the fund, could bind 
the Government of Pakistan99. British courts held that there was no sufficient proof 
that the Government of Pakistan and Dallah were aware of a binding effect of the 
arbitration clause upon the Government and they had no intention to bind the Gov-
ernment with such an arbitration clause100. On the other hand, French courts de-
cided that the trust fund established by the Government by means of a charter was 
in truth a unit that was performing tasks assigned to it by the Government, what 
justified the commencement of arbitration proceedings against the Government. 
British courts are rather willing to bind a non-signatory with an arbitration agreement 
95 M.L. Moses: The Principles…, op. cit., p. 39; Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Government of Turkmenistan, 345 F.3d at 
352 (5th Cir. 2003) (USA).
96 W.W. Park: Arbitration…, op. cit., p. 299.
97 Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Company (Appellant) v. The Ministry of Religious Affairs, Govern-
ment of Pakistan (Respondent), Supreme Court of the United Kingdom (3 November 2010), [2010] UKSC 46 
(UK).
98 The Ministry of Religious Affairs, Government of Pakistan v. Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding 
Company, Court of Appeal of Paris, judgment of 17 February 2011 (France).
99 T. Várady, J.J. Barceló III, A.T. von Mehren: International…, op. cit., pp. 223–233.
100 M.L. Moses: The Principles…, op. cit., p. 41.
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invoking typical contract law solutions, whilst French courts are also open to the 
theories such as veil piercing or a group of companies101. 
The doctrine of a group of companies from the point of view of the extension of 
an arbitration agreement was precisely explained in case Dow Chemical, where the 
arbitration panel held that the conclusion of the arbitration agreement by one com-
pany belonging to the group of companies may under the right circumstances extend 
the scope of the arbitration agreement over the other companies from the same group, 
even if they had not entered into such an arbitration agreement directly. The arbitral 
panel expressed an opinion that participation in the negotiations, conclusion, perform-
ance or termination of the main contract by other companies from the same group, 
operating as one business unit (single economic reality) as well as a mutual intention 
of the group members to be bound by the main contract and arbitration agreement 
could support an extension102. The group structure and the active involvement of non-
signatories in the negotiation and execution of the particular contract must be such as 
to suggest that non-signatories and signatories have consented to arbitrate103. Scholars 
emphasize the role of the third party’s consent. The third party should have the right 
to decide whether they want to be bound by the arbitration agreement104. The case 
facts should at least suggest that such a consent, even implied, existed (e.g. by the 
parties’ conduct)105. Nonetheless, in case Korsnas Marma the Appellate Court in 
Paris ruled that an involvement in performance of the contract created an assumption 
that the parties should have known about arbitration clause in the contract106. 
The group of companies doctrine has been recognized in France and Brazil107. 
On the contrary, generally it is not accepted in the UK108 or Switzerland109. Regard-
ing the above, the doctrine of a group of companies overlaps with the implied con-
sent. It might happen that both bases would be applicable in one case110. Bearing in 
mind that it can compete under specific circumstances with other traditional theories 
101 Ibidem; T. Várady, J.J. Barceló III, A.T. von Mehren: International…, op. cit., p. 234.
102 S. Sołtysiński: Związanie…, op. cit., p. 16; G.B. Born: International…, op. cit., p. 1451; T. Várady, 
J.J. Barceló III, A.T. von Mehren: International…, op. cit., pp. 217–218.
103 S. Brekoulakis: Parties…, op. cit. [in:] S. Brekoulakis, J.D.M. Lew et al. (eds.): The Evolution…, op. cit., p. 141.
104 P. Fouchard, E. Gaillard, B. Goldman: Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial Arbitra-
tion, Kluwer Law International 1999, p. 283; N. Blackaby, J.M. Hunter, C. Partasides, A. Redfern: Redfern…, 
op. cit., p. 71.
105 G.B. Born: International…, op. cit., p. 1415.
106 Judgment of 30 November 1988 in case Korsnas Marma vs. Durand-Auzuas, Revue de l’arbitrage 1989, 
p. 691 (France). 
107 Trelleborg v. Anel, São Paulo State Court of Appeals, Appeal no. 267.450.4/6-00, 7th Chamber of Private 
Law, decided on 24 May 2006 (Brazil). 
108 G.B. Born: International…, op. cit., p. 1453; Peterson Farms v. C&M Farming Ltd. [2004] APP. L.R. 02/04, 
Arbitration, Practice and Procedure Law Reports [2004] EWHC 121 (Comm) 93 (UK); J. Leadley, L. Williams: 
Peterson Farms: There is no Group of Companies Doctrine in English Law, International Arbitration Law Review 
2004, p. 111.
109 Federal Tribunal judgment of 29 January 1996, Saudi Butec Ltd. v. Saudi Arabian Saipem Ltd., 1996 Bull 
3/1996, ASA 496–507 (Switzerland); G.B. Born: International…, op. cit., p. 1453.
110 M.L. Moses: The Principles…, op. cit., p. 38.
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related to the principles of contract law, the sceptics in first place would rather resort 
to these traditional (contractual) theories111. However, there is a noticeable paradigm 
shift when discussing a problem of consent in the light of the aforesaid doctrine. 
Beside factors proving real parties’ intentions, arbitral tribunals sometimes pay more 
attention to other factors such as the need of security of international commercial 
relations or economic reality, which could be a serious departure from the Dow 
Chemical formula112. Although the group of companies doctrine is premised on 
a prerequisite of the existence of a corporate structure, it is treated as a consent-based 
theory, where at least parties’ implied consent to arbitrate should appear, while the 
veil piercing doctrine is of equitable nature with the aim of preventing fraud or 
unfairness. Also both doctrines have different procedural consequences. Typically, 
piercing the corporate veil does not result in the extension of contractual obligations, 
including the obligation to arbitrate to an additional party, but leads to a replacement 
of the “sham” company by the shareholder113. Therefore, the shareholder must be 
a sole defendant in place of the company. 
It is also necessary to touch upon a problem of corporate disputes and arbitration 
clauses included in articles of association or corporate by-laws. Arbitration clauses 
in articles of association are a specific category of arbitration agreements by refer-
ence114. Arbitration clauses in articles of association provide for the resolution of 
disputes by arbitration between a company and its members (shareholders) or disputes 
among its members (shareholders) when disputes which have arisen are related to 
the company’s activity and are covered by the arbitration clause115. There is a serious 
discussion pending whether such a clause may bind other entities: corporate officers, 
corporate bodies, etc., although they have not signed it, or whether an arbitral award 
in such a case could have a binding effect over the other shareholders, who do not 
have to take part in arbitral proceedings. In Germany until 2009 problem of arbitrabil-
ity of corporate disputes had been unsettled, as well as there was an unresolved 
problem of a binding effect of arbitral awards towards other shareholders and corpo-
rate officers, who have not taken part in arbitration116. Under § 248(1) of AktG117 (that 
111 Ibidem.
112 G.B. Born: International…, op. cit., p. 1447; T. Várady, J.J. Barceló III, A.T. von Mehren: International…, 
op. cit., p. 221; both authors cite the award in ICC Case no. 5103, 115 J.D.I. (Clunet) 1206 (1988). 
113 N. Voser: Multi-party Disputes and Joinder of Third Parties [in:] A.J. van den Berg (ed.): 50 Years of the 
New York Convention: ICCA Congress Series, Vol. 14, The Hague 2009, p. 378.
114 A.M. Steingruber: Consent…, op. cit., p. 141.
115 Ibidem. 
116 K. Pörnbacher, A. Dolgorukow: Zdatność arbitrażowa sporów korporacyjnych (o zaskarżanie uchwał) — 
perspektywa niemiecka [Arbitrability of corporate disputes (an action for repealing resolutions) — a German 
perspective] [in:] W. Jurcewicz, K. Pörnbacher, C. Wiśniewski (eds.), Spory korporacyjne w praktyce arbitrażowej 
— perspektywa polska i niemiecka [Corporate disputes in arbitration practice — Polish and German perspective], 
Warsaw 2017, pp. 9–10.
117 German Stock Corporation Act of 6 September 1965 (Federal Law Gazette I, p. 1089), as last amended by 
Article 5 of the Act of 10 May 2016 (Federal Law Gazette I, p. 1142), available at: https://www.gesetze-im-internet.
de/englisch_aktg/englisch_aktg.html#p1291 [accessed on 31.10.2018].
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can be accordingly applied to a limited liability company118) inasmuch as the resolu-
tion adopted by a general assembly is declared null and void by a final and conclu-
sive judgment, the judgment shall take effect for and against all stockholders as well 
as the members of the management board and of the supervisory board, even if they 
are not parties to the proceedings. The aforesaid provision gave rise to a question of 
whether an arbitral award declaring the resolution of the general assembly null and 
void could have the same effect as a court judgment towards other shareholders or 
corporate officers, although generally arbitration as a private method of dispute 
resolution can affect only its parties. In 2009 the Federal Supreme Court rendered 
a judgment in which it specified requirements as to the arbitration agreement which 
could allow extending of the scope of arbitral awards to all shareholders, even if 
they did not take part in arbitration regarding corporate dispute119. They are as fol-
lows: (1) all shareholders must agree for that method of corporate dispute settlement; 
(2) all shareholders and all corporate bodies must be informed about commencement 
and course of proceedings so they could participate in it; (3) all parties are entitled 
to participation in the selection of an arbitral panel; (4) arbitration agreement must 
guarantee that all corporate disputes stemming from it shall be handled by the same 
arbitration institution120. If arbitration clause did not have the aforesaid matters 
regulated, it would be deemed invalid121. The aforementioned solution is worth 
considering in the light of the Polish statutory measures, considering that nowadays 
Poland have struggled with the big dilemma of corporate disputes in arbitration and 
how to provide all stakeholders with equal rights in such proceedings. 
Furthermore, it is worth analysing whether a joint and several liability related 
to a main debt covered by an arbitration clause might be a sufficient basis for extend-
ing the arbitration clause to the person who is jointly and severally liable. Generally, 
scholars are rather sceptical. The main reason is that the joint and several liability is 
independent from the main debt, it exists vis-à-vis the main obligation, therefore it 
cannot result in the extension of the arbitration clause122. As an example, one can 
invoke a guarantee or a surety123. As a starting point, a general statement must be 
made that the guarantor is not a party to the guaranteed contract, thus the guarantor 
is also not a privy to the arbitration agreement contained in the guaranteed contract124. 
However, some arbitral tribunals have held that guarantor could be bound by the 
118 W. Goette: Zdatność arbitrażowa sporów o zaskarżanie uchwał w spółkach kapitałowych — rozwój orzecz-
nictwa Sądu Najwyższego w Niemczech [Arbitrability of disputes encompassing action for repealing resolutions in 
companies — evolution of the case law of German Supreme Court] [in:] W. Jurcewicz, K. Pörnbacher, C. Wiśniew-
ski (eds.), Spory korporacyjne…, op. cit., p. 56.
119 Judgment of BGH of 6 April 2009, II ZR 255/08, NJW 2009, 1962, called Arbitrability II (Germany). 
120 K. Pörnbacher, A. Dolgorukow: Zdatność arbitrażowa…, op. cit. [in:] W. Jurcewicz, K. Pörnbacher, 
C. Wiśniewski (eds.), Spory korporacyjne…, op. cit., pp. 15–17. 
121 Ibidem, p. 18.
122 S. Brekoulakis: Third Parties…, op. cit., pp. 93–94.
123 Ibidem.
124 Ibidem, p. 94; G.B. Born: International…, op. cit., pp. 1459–1460. 
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arbitration clause in the guaranteed contract under specific circumstances, i.e. when 
the guarantor exercises assigned contractual rights after paying off a guaranteed debt, 
when the guarantor may provide a substitute performance under the guaranteed con-
tract or when the guaranteed contract incorporates the terms of the main contract125. 
When discussing the concept of the extension of the arbitration agreement, 
there is so little on requirements of a form of such agreement, although there are 
a lot of jurisdictions where the arbitration agreement must be drawn up in writing126. 
Potentially, if the arbitration agreement must be in writing otherwise null and void, 
its extension to non-signatories can violate such a condition. Some commentators 
explain that the potential requirements regarding the contract form cannot lead to 
irrational results or frustrate parties’ legitimate expectations127. Sometimes, an in-
ternational trade usage is also invoked128. The restrictive attitude to that issue would 
jeopardize the concept of lex mercatoria. Strict adherence to formal requirements 
regardless of real parties’ intentions would contradict the construction of the arbitra-
tion agreement in favorem validitatis129. 
However, there is a noticeable paradigm shift regarding the requirements 
of form. Some jurisdictions have started to liberalize the rigorous requirements of 
a written form of the arbitration agreement130, i.e. by also acknowledging e-mails131. 
The movement is evolving. It is worth mentioning that in 2006, the UNCITRAL 
Model Law was amended, and the requirement of the written form is also met in the 
case of electronic documents (Article 7(4))132. Concerning the problem of non-sig-
natories and the form of the arbitration agreement, special attention must be drawn 
to a judgment of the Swiss Federal Tribunal of 16 October 2003, where the court 
held that a question of whether a non-signatory is bound by the arbitration agreement 
is an issue of determining the scope of the agreement. Consequently, a requirement 
of a written form of the arbitration agreement applies only to initial parties to the 
arbitration agreement and thus it is not an obstacle to extend its scope to non-signa-
tories133. Contrarily, in the case of international arbitration agreements, Article 1507 
of the French Code of Civil Procedure provides that an arbitration agreement shall 
not be subject to any requirements as to its form. Hence, if the existence of consent 
to arbitration is questioned, it will be for the courts or for the arbitral tribunal to 
125 G.B. Born: International…, op. cit., p. 1461; Kvaerner ASA & J.A. Jones, Inc. v. Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, 
210 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2000) (USA).
126 G.B. Born: International…, op. cit., p. 1489; T. Várady, J.J. Barceló III, A.T. von Mehren: International…, 
op. cit., p. 221.
127 G.B. Born: International…, op. cit., pp. 715–716.
128 Ibidem, p. 1491.
129 P. Lalive: Transnational…, op. cit., p. 296.
130 N. Blackaby, J.M. Hunter, C. Partasides, A. Redfern: Redfern…, op. cit., pp. 75–77.
131 W.W. Park: Arbitration…, op. cit., pp. 300–301. 
132 The 2006 Amendments to the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration.
133 Judgment of 16 October 2003, DFT 129 III 727 (Swiss Federal Tribunal); J.F. Poudret, S. Besson: Com-
parative Law of International Arbitration, London 2007, p. 221 with some critical remarks on that solution. 
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research the common intention of the parties at the time of the contract conclusion134. 
German law takes a different stand and adheres to strict statutory measures. German 
courts are keen on extending an arbitration clause to signatories only when applying 
traditional contractual theories such as an assignment135. 
The question of form is not irrelevant because a purpose of establishing require-
ments as to the form is to record and depict real parties’ intent and their consent to 
arbitration. As it has been mentioned previously, currently there is a wide discussion 
pending over the role of consent in international commercial arbitration. S. Brekou-
lakis proposes a new theory on non-signatories based on the concept of dispute 
rather than on the aforementioned contractual theories136. According to his theory, 
the following factors would be crucial: (1) whether a claim related to a non-signa-
tory is inextricably implicated in a dispute (e.g. a surety’s liability); (2) whether there 
is a close relationship between a non-signatory and a signatory; (3) whether there is 
a close interrelatedness between the main contract with an arbitration clause and 
claims by and against signatories and non-signatories137. Therefore, under this the-
ory the requirement of mutual consent of all parties would be diminished. This 
concept is supposed to be a response to the problem of complex, multiparty cases. 
Scholars notice that traditional theories regarding non-signatories have origins in 
contract law. They could work out in the traditional, bipolar structure of arbitration. 
However, nowadays, when the economic reality is more complex, the traditional 
solutions do not have to fit in. Also A. Steingruber makes concessions to jurisdic-
tional approach reminding about the jurisdictional side of arbitration138. Addition-
ally, the author states that the term “consent” is a polymorph term, thus it does not 
have to mean “contract” but also a unilateral expression of consent139. Other authors 
would like to abandon the dogma of consent or minimize its role140. Others refer to 
a modern approach to consent, which is more pragmatic, more focused on facts with 
stronger emphasis on economic reality (B. Hanotiau)141. 
3. POLAND
The arbitration agreement (arbitration clause) in Poland has been treated as 
a kind of a procedural agreement, similar e.g. to a jurisdiction clause placed in an 
134 B. Hanotiau: Consent…, op. cit., p. 547. 
135 Ibidem.
136 S. Brekoulakis: Third Parties…, op. cit., p. 198. 
137 S. Brekoulakis: Rethinking…, op. cit., pp. 629–631.
138 A. Steingruber: Consent…, op. cit., p. 329. 
139 Ibidem, p. 330. 
140 D. Cohen: Arbitrage et groupes de contrats, Rev. arb. 1997, No. 2, pp. 477–478; J.M. Hosking: Non-signa-
tories…, op. cit., p. 302.
141 B. Hanotiau: Consent…, op. cit., p. 554.
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underlying contract. Before an in-depth study on a problem of the extension of the 
arbitration agreement to non-signatories in Poland, some initial remarks must be 
made. Firstly, the author has made an assumption that under current Polish statutory 
measures the arbitration agreement should be assessed from the perspective of pro-
cedural rules (PCCP), and then accordingly with reference to substantive law regula-
tions (especially contract law). Such a standpoint has been supported by a prevailing 
opinion of a vast majority of scholars nowadays. Resultantly, the author shall resort 
to the provisions of PCCP and PCC that could be compared with the aforesaid insti-
tutions created by the practice of international commercial arbitration. Secondly, due 
to a limited scope of this article, the author has not analysed the procedural problem 
of non-signatory participation in arbitration proceedings and manners in which non-
signatories could pursue their right to join an arbitration agreement and consequent-
ly arbitration proceedings (e.g. through a joinder or an intervention). It is a wide and 
complex issue that demands more space, falling outside of the scope hereof. 
The debate over the thesis of this publication should be started with a general 
statement that the arbitration agreement is binding upon the parties that have con-
cluded such an agreement142. The extension of the arbitration agreement should be 
treated merely as an exception143. Under PCC provisions, the obligations stemming 
from a contract are relative144 and effective inter partes145. Therefore, the rule is that 
they are not affecting third party’s rights. 
Even before World War II, a dispute had arisen among scholars in Poland on 
whether it would have been possible to extend a scope of an arbitration agreement 
to legal successors of original parties to the arbitration agreement. Some commenta-
tors were sceptical (e.g. Z. Fenichel)146, however, some others supported such 
a concept (e.g. J. Skąpski)147. Afterwards, the concept allowing binding legal suc-
cessors with an arbitration agreement got a support from the Polish Supreme Court, 
which held that in the case of an assignment also an assignee could invoke the exist-
ence of an arbitration agreement that was originally concluded by an assignor and 
a debtor, not only against the assignor but also the debtor148. It is worth mentioning 
142 M. Tomaszewski [in:] A. Szumański (ed.), Arbitraż…, op. cit., p. 368; Ł. Błaszczak, M. Ludwik: 
Sądownictwo…, op. cit., p. 173; T. Ereciński, K. Weitz: Sąd…, op. cit., p. 146; G. Suliński: Rozstrzyganie sporów 
ze stosunku spółki kapitałowej przez sąd polubowny [Settlement of corporate disputes through arbitration in case 
of LLCs and joint-stock companies], Warsaw 2008, p. 28.
143 G. Suliński: Rozstrzyganie…, op. cit., p. 29.
144 P. Machnikowski: Komentarz do art. 353 k.c. [Commentary on Article 353 PCC] [in:] E. Gniewek, 
P. Machnikowski (eds.), Kodeks cywilny. Komentarz [Civil Code. Commentary], Warsaw 2016, Legalis. 
145 W. Borysiak: Komentarz do art. 353 k.c. [Commentary on Article 353 PCC] [in:] K. Osajda (ed.), Kodeks 
cywilny. Komentarz [Civil Code. Commentary], Warsaw 2017, Legalis.
146 Z. Fenichel: Czy prawa i obowiązki natury procesowej przechodzą na prawnonabywców? [May the rights 
and duties of procedural nature be transferred to the successors?], Przegląd Sądowy 1930, No. 3, p. 73–74.
147 J. Skąpski: W kwestii mocy obowiązującej zapisu na sąd polubowny dla cesjonariusza stron [On effective-
ness of an arbitration agreement for assignees], Polski Proces Cywilny 1934, No. 16–17, pp. 500–504. 
148 Judgment of the Supreme Court of 8 February 1935, III C 778/34, OSNC 1935, No. 11, item 430 (Po-
land).
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that before World War II it was well-settled that when the parties agreed to arbitrate, 
they did not submit themselves personally to the arbitration but a dispute arising out 
of a contract they had concluded149. Resultantly, that statement was the basis for 
further conclusion, that the arbitration agreement binds legal successors, regardless 
of whether the succession is singular or universal. Additionally, T. Ereciński and 
K. Weitz point out that the obligation to arbitrate also passes by means of proce-
dural subrogation to an executor of an estate (Article 988 § 2 PCC)150. Also a trustee 
in bankruptcy will be obliged to go to arbitration in place of a bankrupt. 
Under Article 1161 § 1 PCCP, a conclusion of an arbitration agreement requires 
to specify the subject matter of a dispute or at least a contractual relationship from 
which the dispute has arisen or may arise in the future. Therefore, it is impossible 
to submit to arbitration all disputes that may arise among the parties. Such wording 
of the aforesaid provision supports the point of view that the subjects of the main 
contract and the arbitration agreement should be treated separately from the original 
parties that concluded them. Under Polish regulations, the arbitration agreement is 
valid when it (1) specifies the parties to the arbitration agreement, (2) contains par-
ties’ declaration of will to submit a dispute to arbitration, (3) specifies a dispute or 
contractual relationship from which a dispute may arise. Furthermore, some other 
provisions allow to bind with an arbitration agreement a wider group of entities than 
just the original signatories. Under Article 1163 § 1 PCCP an arbitration agreement 
contained in an agreement or articles of association of a partnership or a corporation 
concerning disputes arising out of such corporate relationship shall be binding upon 
the partnership or corporation and its partners or shareholders. Participation in 
a partnership or corporation of partners or shareholders, both former and present, 
means also becoming the party to such an arbitration agreement (clause)151. Moreo-
ver, commentators in Poland have commenced a discussion on whether there is 
a hypothetical possibility to extend the scope of an arbitration clause included in 
articles of association to members of the management board152. The attitudes to that 
matter are not unanimous. That shall be analysed hereinafter. 
For the purpose of clarifying deliberations over the pattern, it is necessary to 
categorize grounds that could be the basis for extending the scope of an arbitration 
agreement to non-signatories in the light of scholars’ present opinions. First and 
149 J. Skąpski: W kwestii mocy…, op. cit., p. 500; M. Tomaszewski [in:] A. Szumański (ed.), Arbitraż…, op. cit., 
p. 369; A. Wiśniewski: Międzynarodowy…, op. cit., p. 471; Ł. Błaszczak, M. Ludwik: Sądownictwo…, op. cit., 
p. 127; T. Ereciński, K. Weitz: Sąd…, op. cit., pp. 149–150; S. Dalka: Sądownictwo…, op. cit., p. 75; R. Kulski: 
Umowy procesowe…, op. cit., p. 251. 
150 T. Ereciński, K. Weitz: Sąd…, op. cit., pp. 150–151.
151 M. Tomaszewski [in:] A. Szumański (ed.), Arbitraż…, op. cit., p. 372; A. Wiśniewski: Międzynarodowy…, 
op. cit., p. 489; T. Ereciński, K. Weitz: Sąd…, op. cit., p. 147.
152 G. Żmij [in:] B. Gessel-Kalinowska vel Kalisz, Diagnoza arbitrażu. Funkcjonowanie prawa o arbitrażu 
i kierunki postulowanych zmian [Arbitration diagnosis. The functioning of arbitration law and directions of proposed 
changes], Wrocław 2014, pp. 90–91.
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foremost, the doctrine invokes a succession, both universal and singular153. It en-
compasses the succession of inheritance, the assignment of receivables, the acquisi-
tion of debt, the transfer of contractual position, the transformation (a division or 
a merger) of corporation. The second category covers those which rely upon a spe-
cial relationship between a non-signatory and a main contract. That will be a contract 
for performance to a third party, a guarantee/surety, a joint and several liability and 
an arbitration clause in a partnership agreement or articles of association with 
a binding effect for shareholders and officers. That category is pretty universal and 
may contain a wide range of grounds, incompatible with each other at first glance. 
Also, a concept of an implied authority (analysed by A. Wiśniewski) may fall 
within the scope of that category154. The concept of implied authority seems to reflect 
a common law agency theory, or more specifically, apparent authority. The last, third 
category, and the most controversial one, concerns the abuse of corporate (legal) 
personality, the abuse of substantive rights or the doctrine of a group of companies155. 
Prima facie, it seems that the last category covers the grounds that are merely an 
attempt at implementing veil piercing or the doctrine of a group of companies to the 
Polish legal system156. They are widely commented and deemed controversial. 
Attitudes towards them are conflicting and ambiguous. There is also a lack of court 
decisions on that pattern. However, generally they have been questioned by a vast 
majority of commentators, what will be also analysed at a further stage. 
3.1. UNIVERSAL AND SINGULAR LEGAL SUCCESSION 
According to scholars, an arbitration agreement can be passed on to another 
person by means of singular succession that encompasses a transfer of particular 
rights stemming from the contract and by means of universal succession157. Univer-
153 Ł. Błaszczak, M. Ludwik: Sądownictwo…, op. cit., p. 127; G. Suliński: Rozstrzyganie…, op. cit., p. 29. 
154 A. Wiśniewski: Międzynarodowy…, op. cit., pp. 478–480. 
155 A. Wiśniewski proposes to group situations under which the extension can occur into three categories: 
(1) those where a third party’s consent has been expressed in a different manner than by signing a document 
(i.e. by reference), (2) those where legal succession exists, and (3) those where the binding effect exists because 
of objective criteria, e.g. participation in performance of a contract or being a part of a holding group, etc. 
(A. Wiśniewski: Międzynarodowy…, op. cit., pp. 470–471); T. Ereciński and K. Weitz categorise such situations 
as follows: (1) where third parties have not concluded a contract, (2) where third parties are bound by an arbitration 
agreement because of legal succession, (3) other instances (T. Ereciński, K. Weitz: Sąd…, op. cit., pp. 146–147).
156 A. Wiśniewski: Nadużycie prawa podmiotowego jako podstawa rozciągnięcia zapisu na sąd polubowny na 
podmioty powiązane kapitałowo [Abuse of substantive law as the basis for extension of an arbitration agreement 
to other entities due to capital relations and corporate governance], Problemy Prawa Prywatnego Międzynarodo-
wego 2013 Vol. 13, p. 10.
157 K. Weitz [in:] T. Ereciński (ed.), Kodeks postępowania cywilnego. Komentarz. Międzynarodowe postępo-
wanie cywilne. Sąd polubowny [Code of Civil Procedure. Commentary. International civil procedure. Arbitration], 
Vol. 6, Warsaw 2017, p. 857; M. Tomaszewski [in:] A. Szumański (ed.), Arbitraż…, op. cit., pp. 369–372; 
Ł. Błaszczak, M. Ludwik: Sądownictwo…, op. cit., p. 127; T. Ereciński, K. Weitz: Sąd…, op. cit., p. 148; S. Dalka: 
Sądownictwo…, op. cit., p. 75; M. Mazur: Moc…, op. cit., p. 51.
Michał Rządkowski, LL.M.: Arbitration agreement and non-signatories…
46
sal succession pertains to transfer of all rights and duties (including contractual 
obligations) from one entity to another through, e.g. the succession of inheritance 
or the transformation of a corporation158 and regardless of the fact, that the arbitration 
agreement (arbitration clause) is separate and autonomous from the main contract. 
By universal succession the transfer of rights and duties covers both the main contract 
and the arbitration agreement. By contrast, examples of singular succession have 
been given as follows: an assignment, the acquisition (assumption) of debt or the 
transfer of a contractual position including both rights and duties159. They concern 
the main contract, and there is a serious question of whether in the light of severabil-
ity of the arbitration clause they can also embrace the arbitration agreement (arbitra-
tion clause). In other words, whether the arbitration agreement follows substantive 
obligations resulting from the main contract, e.g. in the case of assignment.
On the one hand, an arbitration agreement is separate and independent from 
the main contract. On the other hand, the scope of that rule is not unlimited and of 
absolute nature, because the arbitration agreement is always somehow related to 
some other contractual relationship160. Article 1180 § 1 PCCP stipulates that invalid-
ity or expiration of the main contract in which the arbitration agreement is included 
shall not in and of itself mean the invalidity or expiration of the arbitration agree-
ment. The aforesaid provision is analogous to the provisions of the UNCITRAL 
Model Law161, or to the provisions regulating the severability of the arbitration clause 
in other countries (e.g. in France)162. Therefore, a problem of autonomy of arbitration 
clauses often appears in the context of nullity of the main contract and the impact 
of such nullity on further existence of the arbitration clause. The purpose of this 
regulation is to not allow the nullity of the main contract to deprive the arbitration 
panel of its competence to resolve the dispute resulting from that contract163. There 
is a strong link between the severability doctrine and the competence-competence 
doctrine164. That issue has been analysed by Polish jurisprudence. Some scholars 
claimed that an arbitration agreement in a main contract is one of the features of 
a contractual obligation stemming from the main contract165, what means that along-
side the assignment of a contractual relationship, an assignee becomes also bound 
158 A. Wiśniewski: Międzynarodowy…, op. cit., pp. 471–472; S. Dalka: Sądownictwo…, op. cit., p. 75; 
R. Kulski: Umowy procesowe…, op. cit., pp. 251–252; A. Budniak-Rogala: Charakter…, op. cit., p. 472.
159 M. Tomaszewski [in:] A. Szumański (ed.), Arbitraż…, op. cit., pp. 370–371; A. Wiśniewski: Międzynaro-
dowy…, op. cit., pp. 472–473.
160 G.B. Born: International…, op. cit., pp. 1468–1469.
161 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration of 1985.
162 Article 1447 of the French Civil Proceedings Code.
163 J.J. Barceló III: Who Decides the Arbitrators’ Jurisdiction? Separability and Competence-Competence in 
Transnational Perspective, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 2003, Vol. 36, No. 4, p. 1116; T. Ereciński, 
K. Weitz: Sąd…, op. cit., pp. 148–149.
164 J.J. Barceló III: Who Decides…, op. cit., p. 1116.
165 T. Ereciński, K. Weitz: Sąd…, op. cit., p. 148; A. Budniak-Rogala: Charakter…, op. cit., p. 476; J. Zrałek, 
W. Kurowski: Wpływ przelewu wierzytelności na klauzulę arbitrażową [Impact of the assignment of receivables 
on an arbitration clause], ADR. Arbitraż i Mediacja 2008, No. 3, pp. 144–147.
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by the arbitration agreement stemming originally from the contract between the 
assignor and debtor166. Nowadays, in Poland it is widely accepted that by the assign-
ment of receivables an arbitration agreement follows the assignment, although it is 
separate167. 
In the context of an assignment, two provisions must be taken into considera-
tion: Articles 509 and 513 PCC. The concept of the assignment is premised on 
a principle that it cannot put a debtor in a worse position than before the assign-
ment168. According to Article 509 § 1 PCC, a creditor without a debtor’s permission 
may confer the receivables upon a third person, unless it breaches the law, contrac-
tual stipulation or the nature of the contract. Additionally, alongside the receivables, 
all other rights related to them are conferred upon the third person (an assignee)169. 
Scholars note that such a provision is the basis for extending the arbitration agree-
ment included in a container contract to an assignee170. The arbitration clause in this 
case is treated as an ancillary right. Nevertheless, some authors criticize such 
a construction of the aforesaid provision claiming that the arbitration clause cannot 
be seen as an ancillary right171, therefore they propose a different solution, i.e. to 
treat the arbitration clause as a feature of a main obligation172. A purpose of the 
assignment is to pose an assignee in the same legal situation as their predecessor 
(assignor). However, at this point, the debtor’s position must also be considered. 
That is an issue regulated by Article 513 § 1 PCC, which sets forth that a debtor is 
entitled to claim all defences and objections towards an assignee which they had 
towards an assignor on the date of receiving information about the assignment. As 
many scholars believe, the words “all defences and objections” mean also an arbitra-
tion agreement173. Such a point of view was also adopted by the Polish Supreme 
Court174. Nevertheless, recently some commentators have expressed an opinion that 
Article 513 § 1 PCC should not be construed so widely. Some of them point out that 
this provision is applicable only in one case: where an assignee sues a debtor before 
a state court, and the debtor raises an objection claiming the existence of an arbitra-
tion agreement. In the opposite direction, when an assignee sues a debtor in arbitration, 
the debtor could claim that the arbitration agreement was binding only upon the 
166 G.B. Born: International…, op. cit., p. 1469.
167 A. Wiśniewski: Międzynarodowy…, op. cit., pp. 473–474; Ł. Błaszczak, M. Ludwik: Sądownictwo…, op. cit., 
p. 127; S. Dalka: Sądownictwo…, op. cit., p. 75.
168 K. Zagrobelny [in:] E. Gniewek (ed.), Kodeks cywilny. Komentarz [Civil Code. Commentary], Warsaw 2008, 
p. 929; R. Kulski: Umowy procesowe…, op. cit., p. 258.
169 M. Tomaszewski [in:] A. Szumański (ed.), Arbitraż…, op. cit., p. 370; R. Kulski: Umowy procesowe…, 
op. cit., p. 258; A. Budniak-Rogala: Charakter…, op. cit., p. 475.
170 M. Tomaszewski [in:] A. Szumański (ed.), Arbitraż…, op. cit., p. 370; T. Ereciński, K. Weitz: Sąd…, op. cit., 
p. 150.
171 J. Zrałek, W. Kurowski: Wpływ…, op. cit., p. 144.
172 Ibidem, pp. 145–146.
173 M. Tomaszewski: Umowa…, op. cit., p. 18; M. Tomaszewski [in:] A. Szumański (ed.), Arbitraż…, op. cit., 
p. 370.
174 Judgment of the Supreme Court of 3 September 1998, I CKN 822/97 (Poland).
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debtor and assignor175. Thus, under this theory, an objection as to the existence of 
an arbitration agreement could be raised only before a state court. However, in the 
opposite way, where the assignee would first go to arbitration, the defendant could 
challenge the competence of an arbitration panel176. Such a standpoint has been 
criticized due to the unjust results it could bring177. Nonetheless, regarding the afore-
mentioned argumentation, the authors of that theory propose as a remedy to such 
a flaw to treat an arbitration agreement as a permanent feature of a main obligation, 
instead of transferring an arbitration clause through assignment178. 
There is also another standpoint challenging the aforesaid rule that “all de-
fences and objections” should cover also an objection as to the existence of an ar-
bitration agreement. Some commentators point out that Article 513 § 1 PCC is 
a matter of substantive law, and it does not concern an arbitration agreement. How-
ever, even adoption of such an idea does not deprive debtors of the rights stemming 
from the arbitration agreement. However, it is not a question of Article 513 § 1 PCC 
but rather solely of the features of the arbitration agreement and the fact that this 
agreement refers to a dispute itself and it does not have to bind the same parties that 
concluded such agreement179. Nevertheless, the opinion remains beyond discussion 
that at the moment of assignment an assignee is bound without any restraints by the 
arbitration agreement that an assignor has previously been bound by180. Summing 
up, in case of the assignment, the arbitration agreement becomes binding upon both 
the debtor and the assignee181. Howbeit, K. Weitz precisely explains that not it is not 
the assignment itself, but rather an act of law capable of causing the assignment that 
would bind an assignee with an arbitration agreement182. 
175 J. Zrałek, W. Kurowski: Wpływ…, op. cit., p. 144.
176 Ibidem.
177 M. Tomaszewski [in:] A. Szumański (ed.), Arbitraż…, op. cit., pp. 370–371.
178 J. Zrałek, W. Kurowski: Wpływ…, op. cit., p. 144.
179 A. Wiśniewski: Międzynarodowy…, op. cit., pp. 473–474.
180 M. Tomaszewski [in:] A. Szumański (ed.), Arbitraż…, op. cit., p. 370; A. Wiśniewski: Międzynarodowy…, 
op. cit., p. 475.
181 Ł. Błaszczak, M. Ludwik: Sądownictwo…, op. cit., p. 127; T. Ereciński, K. Weitz: Sąd…, op. cit., pp. 149–150.
182 The author specifies that, although it is well-settled that an assignment could bind a non-signatory with an 
arbitration clause, the concept has not been deeply analysed yet. It is premised on an assumption that assignment 
is always effective and valid. Nevertheless, it has a flaw when facing the problem of ineffective assignment. From 
a substantive law perspective also the transfer of an arbitration clause should remain ineffective. Therefore, 
K. Weitz proposes to look at the problem from the perspective of procedural law (Article 192(3) PCCP), when the 
subject of the dispute has been alienated during the trial. Although the assignor is not entitled to receivables anymore 
from the substantive law perspective, they still are a party to the court proceedings. Thus, in the case of the assign-
ment a legal act capable of transferring the right is sufficient to extend the arbitration clause, regardless of whether 
the incorporated right has really been transferred. The same philosophy could be applied to other bases related to 
singular succession (e.g. the assumption of debt); K. Weitz: Następstwo prawne a związanie zapisem na sąd pol-
ubowny [Legal succession and binding effect of an arbitration agreement], ADR. Arbitraż i Mediacja 2011, No. 4, 
pp. 121–124; K. Weitz: Następstwo prawne w zakresie przedmiotu sporu w toku postępowania przed sądem polu-
bownym [Legal succession during arbitration proceedings], Problemy Prawa Prywatnego Międzynarodowego 
2012, No. 1, pp. 53–54. 
Transformacje Prawa Prywatnego 4/2018
49
An issue similar to the aforesaid problem is that of binding effect of an arbitra-
tion agreement in the case of an assumption of debt183. Yet, it must be mentioned 
that under Polish law, the assumption of debt always requires both a debtor’s and 
creditor’s permission. According to Article 519 § 1 PCC, a third person can replace 
a debtor who at the same time is released from the obligation. However, an assump-
tion of debt can occur in two manners: (1) a creditor may enter into agreement with 
a third party, and here a debtor’s consent is required; (2) a debtor may enter into 
agreement with a third party for an assumption of debt, and in this case a creditor’s 
consent is required (Article 519 § 2(1) and (2) PCC). Under Article 524 § 1 PCC, 
the third person that is taking over the debt is entitled to raise against the creditor 
all defences and objections to which the former debtor has been entitled, except for 
a set-off against the former debtor’s receivables. This provision suggests that except 
for the set-off, all other defences and objections can be raised by the new debtor 
against the creditor, including an arbitration agreement184. The jurisprudence holds 
that such a wording of a provision proves that the arbitration agreement is equally 
effective both to the creditor and the new debtor185. If the provision were understood 
in a different way, it could cause inequality between parties to the contract. In addi-
tion, it is necessary to touch upon a problem of subrogation as a possible basis for 
the extension of an arbitration agreement. The Polish Supreme Court expressed that 
in the case of insurers, who are subrogated to the rights of the insured under Article 
828 § 1 PCC, they are also entitled to invoke (and bound by) the arbitration clause 
of the insured’s main contract. This is a consequence of a rule that the provisions 
regarding assignment are accordingly applicable to the subrogation186. Nevertheless, 
in the same judgment the Polish Supreme Court pointed out that an arbitration clause 
in this situation must be scrutinized carefully, because any kind of constraints in the 
arbitration clause as to its personal scope might prevent any transfer to third per-
sons187. 
This Article also pointed to a transfer of contractual position to a third party as 
a basis for extending an arbitration agreement to non-signatories188. In Polish law, 
the transfer of a contractual position under one legal title (legal basis) does not exist. 
It always takes place as a legal act covering both: an assignment of receivables in-
corporating a bunch of rights from the contract and an assumption of debt which 
incorporates a category of parties’ obligations. Given that, the arbitration agreement 
follows the transfer of contractual position to a new party to the contract. The afore-
mentioned bases could be compared also with those where other entities perform 
the parties’ right stemming from the contract on their behalf. As example, a public 
183 T. Ereciński, K. Weitz: Sąd…, op. cit., p. 148; A. Wiśniewski: Międzynarodowy…, op. cit., p. 472.
184 M. Tomaszewski [in:] A. Szumański (ed.), Arbitraż…, op. cit., p. 370.
185 A. Wiśniewski: Międzynarodowy…, op. cit., p. 472.
186 Judgment of the Supreme Court of 7 November 2013, V CSK 545/12 (Poland). 
187 Ibidem.
188 T. Ereciński, K. Weitz: Sąd…, op. cit., p. 148.
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prosecutor would be bound by an arbitration agreement concluded by the party on 
whose behalf they file a claim. Still, the dispute also must be covered by the arbitra-
tion agreement. Consequently, as long as the public prosecutor aims to pursue the 
party’s right, the arbitration agreement can effectively prevent them from proceed-
ings before a state court189.
3.2. CONTRACT FOR PERFORMANCE TO A THIRD PARTY 
Another interesting issue is a consequence of placing an arbitration agreement 
in a main contract which also stipulates performance to a third party. Commentators 
accept such a situation as a basis for extending the scope of the arbitration agree-
ment190. In this particular case, both actual parties to the contract as well as a third 
party are bound by the arbitration agreement191. A problem of the contract for 
a performance to a third party has been regulated in Article 393 § 1–3 PCC. Under 
that contract, a debtor undertakes before a creditor to perform the contract for the 
benefit of a third party. The third party has a direct claim to the debtor for the per-
formance of the contract192. For example, it might be a contract between a guarantor 
and an entity rendering a warranty work for providing such a work to an entitled 
third person that has a claim towards the guarantor for warranty services193. Of course, 
the parties in that contract can shape their mutual obligations in a different way, 
e.g. only by authorizing the third person to receive a consideration without provid-
ing that person with direct claims towards the debtor for the contract performance194. 
However, if the parties do not stipulate otherwise, the contract for performance to 
the third party shall include the aforesaid claim and entitle the third party to demand 
the contract performance. Regarding the arbitration agreement and the possibility 
of raising an objection before the court as to its existence the detailed attention must 
be paid to Article 393 § 3 PCC, under which a debtor can raise defences and objec-
tions stemming from the contract to a third party. The provision sets forth that 
the debtor can raise both defences and objections regarding the contract with the 
189 Ibidem, p. 151; A. Zieliński [in:] A. Zieliński, K. Flaga-Gieruszyńska (eds.), Kodeks postępowania cywil-
nego. Komentarz [Code of Civil Procedure. Commentary], Warsaw 2016, p. 46.
190 However, recently some critical remarks have been made: G. Poboźniak, K. Ściborowski: Zmiany podmiotowe 
umowy prawa materialnego a zakres związania klauzulą arbitrażową [Changes among parties to a substantive law 
contract and personal scope of an arbitration clause], e-Przegląd Arbitrażowy 2017, No. 1–2, p. 10. 
191 M. Tomaszewski [in:] A. Szumański (ed.), Arbitraż…, op. cit., p. 371; A. Wiśniewski: Międzynarodowy…, 
op. cit., p. 474; T. Ereciński, K. Weitz: Sąd…, op. cit., p. 147; contrarily and sceptically over that solution: 
P. Wrześniewski: Charakter prawny zapisu na sąd polubowny [Legal nature of an arbitration agreement], Oficyna 
Wydawnicza 2011, p. 119.
192 P. Machnikowski: Komentarz do art. 393 k.c. [Commentary on Article 393 PCC] [in:] E. Gniewek, 
P. Machnikowski (eds.), Kodeks…, op. cit., Legalis 2016.
193 Resolution of the Supreme Court of 29 March 1979, III CZP 9/79 (Poland). 
194 P. Machnikowski: Komentarz do art. 393 k.c. [in:] E. Gniewek, P. Machnikowski (eds.), Kodeks…, op. cit., 
Legalis 2016.
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creditor and the contract with the third party. On the contrary, the debtor cannot 
invoke any claims related to the contract between the third party and the creditor. 
Commentators, as examples for such defences and objections, quote a situation 
where the debtor is entitled to claim a set-off, a prescription, or a nullity of a main 
contract, etc.195 Therefore, the scholars mostly invoke defences related to the sub-
stantive law. Nevertheless, the doctrine points out that there could be as well the 
claims and defences concerning governing law or a method of dispute settlement196. 
Resultantly, in case a third person sues a debtor before a state court, the debtor may 
effectively raise an objection as to the existence of the arbitration agreement. How-
ever, as a consequence of that, regarding a teleological interpretation and a purpose 
of this provision, the third party should also be entitled to sue the debtor before 
the arbitration panel, not just be obliged to accept such objection launched by the 
debtor before the state court.
Some theorists cast doubt on that solution, pointing to the severability doctrine 
and independence of an arbitration agreement from a main contract. They say that 
the arbitration clause in a container contract is not a part of that contract, but rather 
a separate agreement. Consequently, the binding effect of the arbitration agreement 
upon a third party should rather be explained by a functional link between the arbi-
tration agreement and the main contract, not the fact that it is an additional, contrac-
tual stipulation197. Apart from the approach towards that problem, there is a wide 
acceptance that the arbitration agreement in the container contract binds a debtor, 
a creditor and a third party for whose benefit the contract should be performed. 
However, in case if the debtor and creditor modified the content of the contract, 
e.g. granted the third party a right to receive a consideration without a right to launch 
a claim, the arbitration clause would not bind that third party. It stems plainly from 
the fact that in this event Article 393 § 3 PCC cannot be applied. Such a comment 
is of little importance at this point because the third person under such circum-
stances would not act on their behalf, but merely as a person authorized by the 
creditor and acting on the creditor’s behalf. Thus, they do not play an independent 
role in this contractual relationship. 
3.3. SURETY AND JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY 
In the light of several remarks made above, an issue of extending an arbitration 
agreement to a surety or a person jointly and severally liable for a debt which stems 
from a main contract covered by the arbitration agreement seems to be an important 
195 Ibidem.
196 M. Tomaszewski [in:] A. Szumański (ed.), Arbitraż…, op. cit., p. 372; M. Tomaszewski: Umowa…, op. cit., 
p. 18; T. Ereciński, K. Weitz: Sąd…, op. cit., p. 147.
197 A. Wiśniewski: Międzynarodowy…, op. cit., p. 474.
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tenet198. Generally, under Polish law joint and several liability cannot constitute 
grounds for binding non-signatories with an arbitration agreement199. Courts note that 
such a liability is independent of a main obligation. What can serve as an example 
under Polish law is a joint liability of an investor together with a general contractor 
towards subcontractors in a contract for construction works. According to Article 
6471 § 1 PCC (after the latest amendments)200, an investor shall bear joint and sev-
eral liability together with a (general) contractor for the payment of remuneration for 
construction works performed by subcontractors. Nevertheless, the detailed scope of 
works which are supposed to be performed by the subcontractors must be passed on 
by the (general) contractor to the investor. The last amendments to the Polish contract 
law have specified in detail the problem of the investor’s liability. Under the new 
provisions such a liability, though joint and several with the (general) contractor’s 
liability, could be curbed under specific circumstances (Article 6471 § 3 PCC). The 
detailed scrutiny over the investor’s liability is not a problem hereof. However, this 
provision is still a source of the investor’s joint and several liability for remuneration 
to subcontractors for construction works. Hence, a serious question appears whether 
an arbitration agreement may be binding upon the investor if it is included in the 
contract between the contractor and the subcontractor. Lastly, commentators have 
given a negative answer on that matter201. First, it has been pointed out that the inves-
tor is liable only for remuneration, thus such an obligation cannot be extended over 
a catalogue of the other contractor’s obligations stemming from the contract202. Ad-
ditionally, it has been emphasized that it is not the investor’s own obligation, but 
rather a contractual relationship similar to a surety, existing next to the main contrac-
tor’s obligation203. Generally, commentators hold that an arbitration agreement drawn 
up for disputes resulting from a specific contract between a debtor and a creditor does 
not reach a surety, a guarantor or persons severally and jointly liable204. The reason 
for such a thesis is the fact that the surety contract does not introduce the surety into 
a contractual relationship between the guaranteed party and the counterparty205. 
198 M. Tomaszewski [in:] A. Szumański (ed.), Arbitraż…, op. cit., p. 373; A. Wiśniewski: Międzynarodowy…, 
op. cit., p. 473; T. Ereciński, K. Weitz: Sąd…, op. cit., p. 151; R. Kulski: Umowy procesowe…, op. cit., p. 256.
199 T. Ereciński, K. Weitz: Sąd… op. cit., p. 151.
200 Act of 7 April 2017 on amendments to some legal acts with a purpose of facilitating the recovery of re-
ceivables (Journal of Laws of 2017, item 933).
201 E. Gapska: Skuteczność zapisu na sąd polubowny zawartego w umowie podwykonawczej wobec inwestora 
ponoszącego odpowiedzialność solidarną na podstawie art. 6471 § 5 k.c. [Effectiveness of an arbitration clause 
contained in a contract with a subcontractor for an investor bearing joint and several liability under Article 6471 
§ 5 PCC], Przegląd Prawa Handlowego 2017, No. 1, p. 43.
202 Ibidem, p. 41. 
203 Ibidem, p. 42.
204 A. Wiśniewski: Międzynarodowy…, op. cit., p. 473; T. Ereciński, K. Weitz: Sąd…, op. cit., p. 151; R. Morek: 
Komentarz do art. 1161 k.p.c. [Commentary on Article 1161 PCCP] [in:] E. Marszałkowska-Krześ (ed.), Kodeks 
postępowania cywilnego. Komentarz [Code of Civil Procedure. Commentary], Warsaw 2017, Legalis; resolution 
of the Supreme Court of 13 July 2011, III CZP 36/11 (Poland).
205 G.B. Born: International…, op. cit., p. 1460.
Transformacje Prawa Prywatnego 4/2018
53
However, such a point of view has been complemented by a comment that the 
surety or the jointly and severally liable person can join such an arbitration agree-
ment. M. Tomaszewski claims that in the case, e.g. if the surety joined an arbitration 
agreement, the creditor could at their own discretion sue the guarantor before an 
arbitration court or a state court206. No doubt, such a solution protects the interests 
of guarantors, sureties or persons jointly and severally liable, who do not have to be 
necessarily interested in solving the dispute with the creditor before an arbitration 
panel.
The author of this publication also thinks that another interpretation, a little bit 
wider, could be introduced on the basis of the PCC provisions regarding a contract 
of surety. Under Article 876 § 1 PCC, the contract of surety means that a surety 
undertakes to perform an obligation stemming from the contract to the creditor if 
the debtor has not performed it. It creates a joint and several liability. Moreover, 
according to Article 883 § 1 PCC a surety may raise all defences and objections 
against the creditor to which the debtor is entitled, especially those regarding a set-
off. Such a regulation is quite similar to the problem of the arbitration agreement 
and assignment, where the debtor is entitled to claim all defences and objections 
towards an assignee which they have had towards an assignor (Article 513 § 1 PCC). 
As scholars have noticed, a surety creates a liability of an auxiliary (secondary) 
nature, closely related to a main debt207. It can be said that the surety’s liability fol-
lows the existence of a guaranteed debt. A nullity of a main debt affects the validity 
of a surety208. Therefore, it is not entirely an independent legal relationship. The 
surety’s position has been shaped by two provisions: Article 879 § 1 and Article 883 
§ 1 PCC. The first one stipulates that a scope of a surety’s liability is determined by 
the status of a debtor’s liability at any time209. Furthermore, Article 883 § 1 PCC 
provides that the surety may raise all defences and objections against the creditor to 
which the debtor is entitled, especially the surety may set off the debtor’s receivables 
against the creditor’s ones. 
These two provisions practically put the surety in the debtor’s legal position. 
Thus, their debts are co-extensive and derivative. Although the surety is liable for 
someone’s debt and it is not their obligation, this legal situation resembles that of 
a person who cumulatively assumes a debt210. It is worth considering whether the 
206 M. Tomaszewski [in:] A. Szumański (ed.), Arbitraż…, op. cit., p. 373; R. Kulski: Umowy procesowe…, 
op. cit., p. 256.
207 J. Górecki: Komentarz do art. 876 k.c. [Commentary on Article 876 PCC] [in:] K. Osajda (ed.), Kodeks…, 
op. cit., Legalis; A. Szpunar: O zasadzie akcesoryjności poręczenia [Principle of auxiliary nature of a surety], 
Palestra 1992, No. 11–12, pp. 23–24.
208 A. Szpunar: O zasadzie…, op. cit., p. 24.
209 J. Górecki: Komentarz do art. 876 k.c. [in:] K. Osajda (ed.), Kodeks…, op. cit., Legalis; A. Szpunar: O za-
sadzie…, op. cit., p. 26. 
210 Z. Radwański [in:] J. Panowicz-Lipska (ed.), Prawo zobowiązań — część szczegółowa. System Prawa 
Prywatnego [Law of obligations — specific part. System of Private Law], Vol. 8, Warsaw 2011, pp. 547–548; 
E. Kosior: Umowa o kumulatywne przystąpienie do długu a umowa poręczenia (uwagi w świetle pozycji prawnej 
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surety could not raise all defences and objections towards the creditor, also those 
related to the existence of an arbitration agreement. Resultantly, in such an event, if 
the creditor sued the surety before a state court, the latter could demand a rejection 
of a lawsuit invoking the existence of the arbitration agreement. Nonetheless, such 
interpretation has not been analysed deeply by commentators and courts in Poland, 
yet. It demands a further and careful analysis regarding the fact that an excessive 
and too liberal construction of the provisions cannot violate someone’s right to court. 
We cannot lose sight of the fact that arbitration is consensual by nature. Also the 
surety’s knowledge about the arbitration clause in the main contract plays a vital 
role in the whole concept and should be taken into account. Therefore, alternatively, 
it is worth considering to allow the surety to extend the arbitration clause against 
the creditor only on their demand, but not in the opposite way, as the surety did not 
take part in conclusion of the main contract. Nevertheless, such a concept requires 
a further in-depth analysis, which exceeds the scope of this publication. In addition, 
some academics point out that in the case of a partners’ joint and several liability 
for debts in a general partnership, the arbitration agreement concluded by the 
general partnership should also bind partners, because the partners’ obligation, in 
truth, mirrors the partnership’s obligation, and thus it should also embrace the arbi-
tration clause related to such an obligation211, contrary to the resolution of the Supreme 
Court212. Summing up, generally a surety, a guarantor, an investor in a construction 
project or a person jointly and severally liable, according to the majority of scholars, 
are not bound by an arbitration agreement included in a main contract between 
original parties, i.e. a debtor and a creditor213, because their liability is a distinct 
obligation that lies next to the obligations stemming from the main contract. Yet, the 
previous remarks cast doubts over the correctness of such interpretation. 
3.4. CORPORATE DISPUTES 
Academic scholarship in Poland regarding the problem of an arbitration clause 
contained in a partnership agreement or in the articles of association is rather impres-
sive. Corporate disputes should be understood as those that may arise between 
a company and its shareholders or among shareholders themselves in relation to 
dłużnika) [Contract for cumulative debt assumption and surety contract — remarks on the debtor’s legal position] 
[in:] T. Sokołowski (ed.), Współczesne tendencje w dziedzinie zabezpieczenia wierzytelności [Modern tendencies 
in securing debts], UAM conference papers, Poznań 2013, p. 100; A. Szpunar: O zasadzie…, op. cit., p. 32.
211 K. Malinowska-Woźniak: Granice podmiotowe zapisu na sąd polubowny zawartego w umowie, której 
stroną jest osobowa spółka handlowa [Ratione personae of an arbitration clause in a contract concluded by 
a commercial partnership], Acta Iuris Stetinensis 2016, No. 4, p. 49.
212 Resolution of the Supreme Court of 13 July 2011, III CZP 36/11 (Poland).
213 R. Kulski: Umowy procesowe…, op. cit., p. 256; resolution of the Supreme Court of 13 July 2011, III CZP 
36/11. 
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a company’s business course. It shall not concern external relationships, i.e. those 
between a company and its creditors.
At first glance, that problem seems to be regulated by Article 1163 § 1 PCCP, 
under which an arbitration clause contained in an agreement or the articles of as-
sociation of a partnership or a corporation concerning disputes arising out of such 
corporate relationship shall be binding on the partnership or corporation and its 
partners or shareholders (Article 1163 § 1 PCCP)214. For the purpose of this publica-
tion, the author shall use the notions: “company” or “corporation” interchangeably 
to describe companies in general. The abovementioned regulation encompasses 
partnerships and companies regulated by Polish Companies Act215 (hereinafter re-
ferred to as PCA), i.e. either partnerships such as a general partnership, a limited 
partnership, a limited liability partnership, or companies: a limited liability com-
pany, a joint-stock company216. Scholars propose to extend the regulation accord-
ingly over a civil law partnership and treat it in a similar manner, though it is just 
a type of contract among entrepreneurs for a joint cooperation to pursue common 
business goals217.
First, before starting an analysis regarding the scope of the arbitration clause, 
some overall remarks on corporate disputes must be made. The question is: what 
should be understood by corporate disputes? That matter has been deeply scrutinized 
by G. Suliński, who divided such disputes into three separate groups: (1) disputes 
regarding claims for consideration (i.e. payments), (2) disputes relating to an appeal 
against a resolution of the assembly of shareholders, (3) actions for formation of 
law218. The first category — disputes regarding claims for consideration — includes, 
e.g. claims for payment of dividends219, claims for remuneration to shareholders for 
performance of non-monetary obligations to the company220 or the company’s claims 
for paying up share capital to the company by shareholders221. The second category 
relates to an appeal against resolutions of the assembly of shareholders, which is 
214 M. Tomaszewski [in:] A. Szumański (ed.), Arbitraż…, op. cit., p. 372; T. Ereciński, K. Weitz: Sąd…, op. cit., 
p. 150.
215 Act of 15 September 2000 — Code of Commercial Partnerships and Companies (Journal of Laws of 2000, 
No. 94, item 1037).
216 A. Wiśniewski: Międzynarodowy…, op. cit., p. 489; T. Szczurowski: Zakres podmiotowy zapisu na sąd 
polubowny sporu korporacyjnego [Entities bound by an arbitration agreement referring to corporate disputes], 
Monitor Prawa Handlowego 2013, No. 6, p. 10; A. Jakubecki: Komentarz do art. 1163 k.p.c. [Commentary on 
Article 1163 PCCP] [in:] A. Jakubecki (ed.), Komentarz aktualizowany do Kodeksu postępowania cywilnego [Code 
of Civil Procedure. Updated commentary], Lex el. 2016. 
217 A. Zieliński [in:] A. Zieliński, K. Flaga-Gieruszyńska (eds.), Kodeks…, op. cit., p. 1799.
218 G. Suliński: Rozstrzyganie…, op. cit., p. 115 et seq. 
219 Ibidem, p. 115.
220 Ibidem, pp. 115–116.
221 Ibidem, pp. 116–117; A. Szumański: Zakres podmiotowy zapisu na sąd polubowny w sporze ze stosunku 
spółki kapitałowej ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem sporu powstałego na tle rozporządzenia prawami udziałowymi 
[Ratione personae of an arbitration agreement in corporate disputes stemming from the disposal of rights attached 
to shares] [in:] P. Nowaczyk, S. Pieckowski, J. Poczobut, A. Szumański, A. Tynel (eds.), Międzynarodowy i kra-
jowy arbitraż handlowy u progu XXI wieku. Księga pamiątkowa dedykowana doktorowi habilitowanemu Tadeuszowi 
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non-uniform category. Such disputes would include actions for repeal of a sharehold-
ers’ resolution or action for a declaration of invalidity of a shareholders’ resolution222. 
It is worth noting that the declaration of annulment has a declarative nature, which 
means that the invalidity itself occurs ex tunc223. As G. Suliński points out, if share-
holders bring a case for invalidity of the resolution, the competence of an arbitration 
panel shall not be excluded in that matter and arbitrators will keep their power to 
handle the dispute224. The last, third category, refers to claims for formation of law, 
e.g. the exclusion of a shareholder or a dissolution (winding-up) of the company225.
Regardless of the aforementioned, there is still an unsettled problem of arbi-
trability of corporate disputes, mainly regarding actions for repeal of a shareholders’ 
resolution or actions for declaration of invalidity of a shareholders’ resolution. Ar-
ticle 1157 PCCP sets forth that arbitrability of the dispute depends on whether par-
ties are entitled to conclude a settlement on the issue in dispute. Unfortunately, 
a shape of the provision casts doubts on whether it concerns all disputes (both in-
volving economic and non-economic interests) or, alternatively, the requirement of 
ability of being settled through agreement only refers to non-economic interests, 
what would makes disputes involving economic interests always arbitrable226. Re-
sultantly, in the first scenario each dispute must be scrutinized through a test of ar-
bitrability (whether the dispute can be settled by the parties by agreement in dispute)227 
or, in the second scenario, all disputes involving economic interests should be ipso 
iure deemed arbitrable, while the test would just regard disputes involving non-
economic interests. In the light of corporate disputes, such an issue is of great im-
portance. On the one hand, the prevailing majority of scholars acknowledge that 
corporate disputes generally involve economic interests228. On the other hand, some 
universal categories, such as “invalidity”, do not seem to be capable of being rem-
edied through a settlement in dispute, bearing in mind that invalidity has an ex tunc 
effect and objective nature229. The problem of remedial actions of invalid acts falls 
outside the scope hereof. As a response to the aforesaid matter, some scholars propose 
to treat Article 1163 § 1 PCCP as a sole basis for arbitrability of corporate disputes 
(lex specialis to Article 1157 PCCP)230, so it could include all corporate disputes, 
Szurskiemu [International and domestic arbitration on the threshold of the 21st century. Liber Amicorum as 
a tribute to Professor Tadeusz Szurski], Warsaw 2008, p. 230.
222 G. Suliński: Rozstrzyganie…, op. cit., pp. 154–161.
223 Ibidem, p. 162.
224 Ibidem, p. 190.
225 Ibidem, pp. 194–199.
226 T. Ereciński, K. Weitz: Sąd…, op. cit., p. 121. 
227 K. Weitz [in:] T. Ereciński (ed.), Kodeks…, op. cit., p. 836. 
228 S. Sołtysiński [in:] S. Sołtysiński, A. Szajkowski, J. Szwaja, Kodeks Spółek Handlowych. Komentarz [Com-
mercial Companies Code. Commentary], Vol. 3, Warsaw 2008, pp. 244–245. 
229 K. Weitz [in:] T. Ereciński (ed.), Kodeks…, op. cit., p. 837; T. Ereciński, K. Weitz: Sąd…, op. cit., p. 122.
230 A. Szumański: Zakres podmiotowy… [in:] P. Nowaczyk, S. Pieckowski, J. Poczobut, A. Szumański, 
A. Tynel (eds.), Międzynarodowy i krajowy arbitraż…, op. cit., p. 231; G. Suliński, Rozstrzyganie…, op. cit., 
p. 260.
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e.g. those covering a problem of the invalidity. Nevertheless, the Polish Supreme 
Court in 2009 rejected such a possibility holding that Article 1157 PCCP refers to 
all disputes and their arbitrability, and Article 1163 § 1 PCCP specifies requirements 
as to the form and scope231. Nevertheless, some subsequent judgments of the Supreme 
Court suggested that the requirement of arbitrability of the disputes should be con-
strued widely referring not to any particular dispute but rather to the rights being at 
parties’ free disposal, thus such formula would contain also a problem of invalidity 
of legal acts232. The problem of arbitrability of corporate disputes falls outside the 
scope of this article, however, it would be impossible to move on with further 
analysis without any remarks on such an important matter.
Generally, disputes resulting from a corporate structure shape a wide range of 
various claims and actions. Part of the aforementioned disputes might refer to the 
shareholders and company. But some others can also have an impact on other persons’ 
interests, e.g. the management board or some of its members or even employees. 
For example, a resolution of the assembly of shareholders might appoint new mem-
bers of the management board and demote the old ones. Given that, it is necessary 
to analyse an issue of entities that potentially could invoke the arbitration clauses 
included in partnership agreements or articles of association in corporate disputes. 
Previously cited Article 1163 § 1 PCCP indicates that an arbitration clause 
contained in an agreement or the articles of association of a partnership or corpora-
tion shall be binding on the partnership or corporation and its partners or sharehold-
ers. The provision does not mention any other persons, e.g. members of the manage-
ment board. Both, judiciary and jurisprudence, treat the arbitration agreement de-
scribed above as an arbitration agreement incorporated by reference233. The reason 
of such holding is that every time when a specific corporate dispute arises, e.g. as 
a result of a shareholders’ resolution, the parties shall invoke an arbitration clause 
included in different documents — a partnership agreement or articles of association. 
However, the provision does not specify upon which particular shareholders or 
partners the arbitration clause should be binding. It does not say whether it concerns 
the shareholders or partners who originally concluded the partnership agreement or 
the articles of association, or only those who are parties to the arbitration agreement 
at the moment when the dispute arises. Scholars are rather unanimous that it can 
231 Resolution of the Supreme Court of 7 May 2009, III CZP 13/09 (Poland); T. Ereciński, K. Weitz: Sąd…, 
op. cit., p. 122. 
232 K. Weitz [in:] T. Ereciński (ed.), Kodeks…, op. cit., p. 835; A. Szumański: Treść i forma zapisu na sąd 
polubowny w sporach korporacyjnych [Content and form of an arbitration agreement in corporate disputes], 
Monitor Prawa Handlowego 2014, No. 2, p. 8; decision of the Supreme Court of 18 June 2010, V CSK 434/09; 
resolution of the Supreme Court of 23 September 2010, III CZP 57/10 (Poland); R. Kos: Zdatność arbitrażowa 
sporów o ważność uchwał spółek kapitałowych [Arbitrability of disputes regarding validity of corporate resolu-
tions], Przegląd Prawa Handlowego 2014, No. 3, p. 36. 
233 Judgment of the Supreme Court of 12 October 2012, IV CSK 82/12 (Poland); A. Zieliński [in:] A. Zieliński, 
K. Flaga-Gieruszyńśka, Kodeks…, op. cit., p. 1800. 
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bind all partners and shareholders, either present or former234. It is compatible with 
global trends. In this case, the scope of arbitration should be shaped by an issue at 
stake and the nature of a dispute. However, no one can ignore PCA substantive law 
provisions regarding an action for repeal of a resolution of the general assembly. 
Under Article 250(1) PCA, also particular members of a management board are 
entitled to launch a claim within the aforementioned scope. Therefore, there is 
a contradiction between Article 1163 PCCP, which does not mention management 
board members as bound by an arbitration clause, and Article 250(1) PCA, which 
entitles also corporate bodies and management board members to file a lawsuit 
for repeal of a resolution. Furthermore, Article 254 § 1 PCA stipulates that a final 
judgment repealing the resolution has a binding effect in relations between the 
company and all partners and in relations between the company and members of the 
corporate bodies. There is a serious question of whether arbitral award could have 
a similar effect, even if not all of stakeholders took part in arbitration235. 
According to the scholars’ prevailing opinion, in the case of other persons that 
could have an interest in a dispute resolution but are not mentioned in Article 1163 
§ 1 PCCP, i.e. members of a management board, they are not parties to such an ar-
bitration clause and are not entitled to take part in arbitration proceedings under 
current Polish statutory measures236. Nonetheless, there are some single critical 
standpoints about such strict interpretation of Article 1163 § 1 PCCP237. G. Suliński 
emphasizes that sticking to the letter of law might cause a risk that the same dispute 
would be tried partially by a state court and partially by an arbitration panel. For 
example, where a member of a management board and shareholder would bare a joint 
and several liability for undervaluation of a contribution in-kind238. Consequently, 
it might transpire that in the dispute regarding a consideration the arbitration panel 
234 A. Szumański: Zakres podmiotowy… [in:] P. Nowaczyk, S. Pieckowski, J. Poczobut, A. Szumański, A. Tynel 
(eds.), Międzynarodowy i krajowy arbitraż…, op. cit., p. 227; Ł. Błaszczak, M. Ludwik: Sądownictwo…, op. cit., 
p. 127; T. Ereciński, K. Weitz: Sąd…, op. cit., p. 147; M. Romanowski: Utrata statusu wspólnika a związanie za-
pisem na sąd arbitrażowy [Losing the status of a shareholder in the light of the effectiveness of an arbitration 
clause], Przegląd Prawa Handlowego 2006, No. 6, p. 55; T. Szczurowski: Zakres…, op. cit., p. 11; decision of the 
Supreme Court of 1 March 2000, I CKN 845/99 (Poland); R. Morek: Komentarz do art. 1163 k.p.c. [Commentary 
on Article 1163 PCCP] [in:] E. Marszałkowska-Krześ, Kodeks…, op. cit., Legalis.
235 A. Wiśniewski: Rozstrzyganie sporów korporacyjnych przez sądy polubowne w świetle nowej regulacji 
zdatności arbitrażowej sporów [Adjudication of corporate disputes by arbitral panels in the light of the new regu-
lations on arbitrability of disputes] [in:] P. Nowaczyk, S. Pieckowski, J. Poczobut, A. Szumański, A. Tynel (eds.), 
Międzynarodowy i krajowy arbitraż…, op. cit., p. 298; R. Kos accepts that possibility (R. Kos: Zdatność arbitrażowa…, 
op. cit., p. 34).
236 T. Ereciński, K. Weitz: Sąd…, op. cit., p. 147; R. Morek: Arbitraż i mediacja. Komentarz [Arbitration and 
mediation. Commentary], Warsaw 2006, pp. 148–149; G. Suliński: Rozstrzyganie…, op. cit., p. 260; A. Budniak: 
Forma zapisu na sąd polubowny w świetle polskiego i niemieckiego postępowania cywilnego — zagadnienia 
prawnoporównawcze [Form of arbitration agreement in the light of Polish and German civil proceedings — a com-
parative law analysis], ADR. Arbitraż i Mediacja 2009, No. 4, Legalis el.
237 S. Sołtysiński: Związanie…, op. cit., p. 28. 
238 G. Suliński: Związanie członka organu spółki zapisem na sąd arbitrażowy zawartym w umowie (statucie) 
spółki [Binding effect of an arbitration clause contained in a company’s articles of association upon a member of 
the company’s body], Przegląd Prawa Handlowego 2015, No. 6, p. 33.
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would assess a shareholder’s liability differently from a state court’s assessment of 
the same legal situation, but in the case against a member of a management board. 
Such a dualism, according to some scholars, requires that a teleological interpreta-
tion be applied, looking at the purpose of the provision, and therefore the arbitration 
clause included in a partnership agreement or articles of association be extended to 
the company’s bodies or members of the management board239. Such an interpreta-
tion would take into account the need for protection of a legal interest of persons 
who have such an interest in the dispute settled in arbitration proceedings240. Also 
the aforementioned dualism, which would allow the same legal issues to be assessed 
by two different bodies (institutions), has been criticized by the Polish Supreme 
Court expressing a view that such an outcome is highly undesirable241. B. Sołtys 
derives the possibility of extending an arbitration clause contained in a partnership 
agreement or articles of association to the company’s bodies and members of the 
management board from a functional link between disputes: a dispute involving the 
company and members of the management board and a dispute over which compe-
tence of an arbitration panel is unquestionable242. Such a point of view can be justi-
fied by a functional interpretation of the provisions. Others propose to span the ar-
bitration clause over members of the management board, but only in case if they 
have signed it243. Furthermore, some authors point out that there is no contradiction 
between Article 1163 § 1 PCCP and PCA provisions244. R. Kos explains that mem-
bers of a management board, although they have capacity to launch claims under 
Article 250(1) PCA, they do not pursue their legal interest but rather interest of the 
company and its shareholders245. In addition, corporate bodies do not have a separate 
legal personality, therefore they cannot be a party to an arbitration agreement246. This 
is a main reason why Article 1163 PCCP does not list them. Consequently, both the 
company itself and their corporate bodies are covered by the arbitration clause, what 
results from the fact that the arbitration clause in articles of association partially 
239 Ibidem, p. 35; R. Uliasz: Rozstrzyganie sporów korporacyjnych przez sąd polubowny — wybrane zagadnie-
nia [Settlement of corporate disputes through arbitration — selected issues], ADR. Arbitraż i Mediacja 2008, No. 3, 
Legalis.
240 Similarly A. Surma: Dopuszczalność poddania do rozpoznania sądowi polubownemu sporów dotyczących 
uchylenia lub stwierdzenia nieważności uchwał organów spółek kapitałowych [Arbitrability of disputes related 
to a repeal or an annulment of resolutions taken by the company’s bodies], Studia Prawno-Ekonomiczne 2014, 
Vol. 93, p. 91.
241 Decision of the Supreme Court of 1 December 2017, I CSK 170/17. 
242 B. Sołtys: Zapis na sąd polubowny w prawie spółek [Arbitration agreement in corporate law] [in:] 
J. Frąckowiak (ed.), Kodeks spółek handlowych po pięciu latach [Polish Commercial Companies Code after five 
years], Wrocław 2006, p. 209. 
243 K. Falkiewicz, R.L. Kwaśnicki: Arbitraż i mediacja w świetle najnowszej nowelizacji kodeksu postępowa-
nia cywilnego [Arbitration and mediation in the light of the latest reform of the Polish Code of Civil Procedure], 
Przegląd Prawa Handlowego 2005, No. 11, p. 34.
244 R. Kos: Zdatność arbitrażowa…, op. cit., p. 35.
245 Ibidem, p. 35.
246 A. Szumański: Treść…, op. cit., pp. 18–19; R. Kos: Zdatność arbitrażowa…, op. cit., p. 35; opposite to that 
E. Marszałkowska-Krześ cited by G. Suliński: Rozstrzyganie…, op. cit., p. 111.
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shapes the internal corporate governance of the company that is also binding upon 
corporate bodies247. Nonetheless, such a standpoint still seems to be isolated.
Resultantly, the most certain standpoint concerning the presented problem seems 
to be that currently, under Polish law, an arbitration clause included in a partnership 
agreement or in articles of association binds only the company and its partners and 
shareholders, both present and former ones, regardless of whether they took part 
in drawing up of the arbitration clause248. It shall not concern the other entities, 
i.e. members of management boards, employees, officers, etc.249 However, some 
other scholars point out that Article 1163 PCCP does not exclude such a possibility, 
or that it only sets up minimal standards as to the form which could be clarified by 
the parties in the agreement250. Comparing the aforesaid statutory measures with 
the previously presented German solutions, some parallels could be drawn between 
the current status of the Polish approach towards the problem and the German status 
before the Arbitrability II judgment. Recognizing the flaws of the system, in 2010 
the Polish Codification Committee for Civil Law proposed some amendments to the 
current provisions. Firstly, it was proposed to extend the scope of the arbitration clause 
in articles of association to corporate bodies and their members (e.g. members of 
management boards) by new Article 1163 § 1 PCCP. Secondly, a requirement was 
introduced to new Article 1163 § 1 PCCP for mandatory communications (announce-
ment to stakeholders) stipulated in the arbitration clause. Thus, the arbitration clause 
must provide a mandatory announcement about the commencement of arbitration in 
a manner generally required for official communications in the company251. Also 
other authors proposed to regulate such a matter, e.g. by adding a new set of provi-
sions to PCCP regulating specifically the problem of corporate disputes in arbitration, 
i.e. the problem of arbitrability of corporate disputes or the right to a joinder252. 
A. Szumański notices that the aforesaid discrepancies create huge legal uncertainty253. 
247 R. Kos: Zdatność arbitrażowa…, op. cit., p. 35.
248 K. Weitz [in:] T. Ereciński (ed.), Kodeks…, op. cit., p. 874; M. Tomaszewski [in:] A. Szumański (ed.), 
Arbitraż…, op. cit., p. 372; T. Ereciński, K. Weitz: Sąd…, op. cit., p. 147; G. Suliński: Rozstrzyganie…, op. cit., 
pp. 257–258; T. Szczurowski: Zakres…, op. cit., p. 12; A. Szumański: Treść…, op. cit., p. 18. 
249 A. Szumański: Zakres podmiotowy… [in:] P. Nowaczyk, S. Pieckowski, J. Poczobut, A. Szumański, 
A. Tynel (eds.), Międzynarodowy i krajowy arbitraż…, op. cit., p. 228; R. Morek: Komentarz do art. 1163 k.p.c. 
[in:] E. Marszałkowska-Krześ: Kodeks…, op. cit., Legalis; M. Kłos: Komentarz do art. 1163 k.p.c. [Commentary 
on Article 1163 PCCP] [in:] A. Marciniak: Kodeks postępowania cywilnego. Komentarz. Art. 1096–1217 [Code of 
Civil Procedure. Commentary. Articles 1096–1217], Vol. 4, Warsaw 2017, Legalis. 
250 A. Szumański: Treść…, op. cit., pp. 18–19.
251 A. Szumański: Przeszkody prawne w przyjęciu kognicji sądów arbitrażowych w sporach o zaskarżenie 
uchwał zgromadzeń spółek kapitałowych (uwagi de lege lata oraz de lege ferenda) [Legal obstacles regarding 
competence of arbitration tribunals in disputes relating to resolutions of general assemblies of shareholders (de 
lege lata and de lege ferenda remarks)] [in:] W. Jurcewicz, K. Pörnbacher, C. Wiśniewski (eds.), Spory korpora-
cyjne…, op. cit., p. 129. 
252 M. Tomaszewski: O zaskarżaniu uchwał korporacyjnych do sądu polubownego — uwagi de lege ferenda 
[On repealing corporate resolutions in arbitration — de lege ferenda remarks], Przegląd Sądowy 2012, No. 4, 
pp. 34–35. 
253 A. Szumański: Przeszkody…, op. cit., p. 114. 
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3.5. IMPLIED AUTHORITY 
Implied authority, as a basis for an extension of the arbitration agreement ana-
lysed by A. Wiśniewski254, is seemingly aimed at mirroring the common law institu-
tion of agency, namely apparent authority. The first question that must be put forward 
is whether under Polish law it is possible to apply a concept of implied authority to 
conclusion of an arbitration agreement. An agency relationship relies upon the as-
sumption that an entity which concludes a main contract and an arbitration agreement 
is acting as an agent of another entity. The case facts should indicate that the agent 
has operated within the scope of their authorization and with intent of binding their 
principal with their action. Careful attention must be also drawn to the principal’s 
behaviour that triggers a false impression to a third person that the agent has an 
authorization to represent the principal (apparent authority). Therefore, two funda-
mental issues must be discussed: first, whether it is possible to grant tacitly a power 
of attorney to enter into an arbitration agreement in Poland; second, whether it is 
possible that such an implied agent could also bind tacitly their principal with the 
arbitration agreement. These problems cannot be sorted out without a direct refer-
ence to the provisions on requirements of form for an arbitration agreement (Article 
1162 PCCP)255. The consequences of not fulfilling the requirements of a written form 
of an arbitration agreement are crucial in this case. The assumption that the arbitration 
agreement should be concluded in writing otherwise it is null and void would jeopard-
ize further debate over the possibility of concluding such an agreement tacitly.
In accordance with the Polish scholars’ traditional standpoint which was shaped 
on the basis of previous legal provisions (Article 698 § 1 et seq. PCCP) before a huge 
reform of 2005256, the arbitration agreement had to be drafted in writing and signed 
by both parties, otherwise was null and void257. Such a standpoint did not stem ex-
pressly from the aforementioned provisions which wording used a conditional form 
“should” and did not provide as a consequence of lack of a written form the nullity 
of the arbitration agreement. In the course of time, such a strict point of view has 
changed, especially after reform of 2005, when to the traditional written form (how-
ever also without nullity as a consequence of non-fulfilment) also other more lib-
eral forms were added. In the light of the new regulations, the requirement of the 
written form is also met when the arbitration agreement is contained in a document 
signed by the parties or in an exchange of letters or communications by means of 
telecommunication devices that provide a record of the agreement. Also, the refer-
254 A. Wiśniewski: Międzynarodowy…, op. cit., pp. 478–479.
255 The requirements of form have been also mentioned by A. Wiśniewski [in:] A. Wiśniewski: Międzynarodowy…, 
op. cit., p. 478.
256 Act of 28 July 2005 — amendment to Code of Civil Procedure (Journal of Laws of 2005, No.178, item 
1478).
257 Ł. Błaszczak, M. Ludwik: Sądownictwo…, op. cit., p. 117; T. Ereciński, K. Weitz: Sąd…, op. cit., p. 136; 
S. Dalka: Sądownictwo…, op. cit., pp. 75–76. 
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ence in a contract to a document containing an arbitration clause (incorporation by 
reference) constitutes an arbitration agreement (Article 1162 § 2 PCCP). But such 
a reference must point directly to the arbitration clause. There is no obstacle to 
conclude an arbitration agreement by e-mail or telefax258. A dispute has arisen among 
scholars regarding the consequences of not observing the form presented above. 
Some commentators claim that not meeting the requirement of form specified in 
Article 1162 PCCP, regardless of whether it is a written form or liberal ones, causes 
the nullity of the arbitration agreement or at least its ineffectiveness259. They empha-
size that an arbitration agreement is a specific procedural agreement to which the 
PCC provisions on consequences of non-adherence to the requirement of the written 
form cannot be applied accordingly, if there are no consequences of such a flaw 
specified in PCCP260.
The opposite point of view highlights that the PCC provisions can be applied to 
the aforesaid situation if the form of an arbitration agreement is not observed261. Even 
if an arbitration agreement should be drawn up in writing, and such a form were not 
observed, where the provision itself did not provide for the nullity as a consequence, 
such agreement under PCC would be still valid. However, at a further stage some 
problems could arise concerning evidence and proof of the existence of such an arbi-
tration agreement262. It could be impossible to prove its existence, e.g. by witnesses’ 
testimonies. Nevertheless, such obstacles would not exist in the case of a dispute 
between entrepreneurs or where the certain legal act has been substantiated by means 
of a document (what can mean nowadays also an unsigned document or e-mail). They 
could pursue to prove that the arbitration agreement has been entered into by means 
of witnesses’ testimonies or parties’ interrogation what results directly from Article 
74 § 4 PCC. Loosening of the requirement of form could open leeway to the possibil-
ity of concluding an arbitration agreement in any form, even tacitly263. The problem 
258 Ł. Błaszczak, M. Ludwik: Sądownictwo…, op. cit., pp. 116–117.
259 K. Weitz [in:] T. Ereciński (ed.), Kodeks…, op. cit., p. 871; A. Wiśniewski: Międzynarodowy…, op. cit., 
p. 479; T. Ereciński, K. Weitz: Sąd…, op. cit., pp. 136–137; G. Suliński: Rozstrzyganie…, op. cit., pp. 36–37; 
A. Szumański: Konkludentne przystąpienie do zapisu na sąd polubowny [Joining arbitration agreement by implied 
action], Problemy Prawa Prywatnego Międzynarodowego 2012, Vol. 11, p. 44; J. Jankowski: Komentarz do art. 
1162 k.p.c. [Commentary on Article 1162 PCCP] [in:] J. Jankowski (ed.), Kodeks postępowania cywilnego. Ko-
mentarz. Art. 730–1217 [Code of Civil Procedure. Commentary. Articles 730–1217], Vol. 2, Warsaw 2015, Legalis; 
judgment of the Appellate Court in Szczecin of 5 January 2016, I ACa 711/15 (Poland); A. Budniak: Forma zapisu…, 
op. cit., Legalis el.
260 T. Ereciński, K. Weitz: Sąd…, op. cit., pp. 136–137. 
261 B. Gessel-Kalinowska vel Kalisz: Zastrzeżenie formy pisemnej dla umowy o arbitraż jako zastrzeżenie 
formy pisemnej dla celów dowodowych [Requirement of a written form for an arbitration agreement as the requi-
rement of form for evidentiary purposes], Państwo i Prawo 2015, No. 12, p. 81.
262 Ł. Błaszczak: Skarga o uchylenie wyroku sądu polubownego [Complaint to set aside an arbitral award], 
Prawo Spółek 2005, No. 2, p. 30; B. Kaczmarek-Templin: Kilka uwag o elektronicznej postaci umowy o arbitraż 
w kontekście przepisów regulujących formę zapisu na sąd polubowny [Several comments on the electronic form of 
arbitration agreement in relation to provisions which regulate the form of arbitration agreement], ADR. Arbitraż 
i Mediacja 2010, No. 3, Legalis.
263 B. Gessel-Kalinowska vel Kalisz: Zastrzeżenie…, op. cit., p. 80. 
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of form of an arbitration agreement and the consequences of non-adherence to such 
a form are not the subject matter of this publication, though it is an interesting 
topic worth a separate dissertation. The author just wants to emphasize that require-
ment as to the form as fundamental for the existence or validity of an arbitration 
agreement in the light of the aforesaid does not have to be observed so strictly, and 
scholars’ opinions are disparate264. Additionally, A. Szumański proposes to distinguish 
between two situations. The first one is a conclusion of an arbitration agreement by 
implied action. The other one is where a third party joins tacitly an arbitration agree-
ment, which has been already drawn up in writing265. That resembles a Swiss solu-
tion provided by the Swiss Federal Tribunal in 2003266. 
Apart from the above deliberation, a special attention must be paid to Article 
1167 PCCP which expressly stipulates that a power of attorney granted by an entre-
preneur to perform a specific legal act (e.g. conclusion of a contract) encompasses 
also an authorization to enter into an arbitration agreement in relation to the legal act, 
unless otherwise set forth in the document of such a power of attorney. In this case, 
the agent by the fact of being authorized to conclude a main contract is also author-
ized to enter into the arbitration agreement. Thus, the provision establishes a legal 
presumption. Such a point of view, before Article 1167 PCCP was enacted, had been 
presented by M. Tomaszewski267. Therefore, in case of entrepreneurs, the power of 
attorney to conclude a commercial contract covers also the authorization to draft an 
arbitration agreement. Nevertheless, the existence of such an authorization does not 
simply mean that the agent would use it to enter into the arbitration agreement on the 
principal’s behalf. However, it seems that such understanding of implied authority 
does not match the concept of agency worked out by the practice of international 
commercial arbitration. The agency concept assumes that conclusion of an arbitration 
agreement together with a main contract by one entity would in truth bind also other 
entities that are in some relationship with the signatory. Mostly, it has been invoked 
as an alternative way for veil piercing or the doctrine of a group of companies.
Regarding the previous remarks, theorists are rather sceptical about the ap-
plication of the concept in the Polish legal system. A. Szumański claims that implied 
authority (actual authority), where members of a group of companies act on each 
other’s behalf, cannot be applied because Polish law does not provide a group of 
companies with a legal personality (they are separate). Furthermore, legal persons 
(including companies) can be represented only by their bodies under Article 38 
PCC268. A. Wiśniewski points out that a concept of entering into an arbitration agree-
ment by implied authority cannot be accepted because of the requirement as to the 
264 Ł. Błaszczak, M. Ludwik: Sądownictwo…, op. cit., p. 117; T. Ereciński, K. Weitz: Sąd…, op. cit., p. 136.
265 A. Szumański: Konkludentne…, op. cit., p. 48.
266 Judgment of 16 October 2003, DFT 129 III 727 (Swiss Federal Tribunal). 
267 M. Tomaszewski: Umowa…, op. cit., p. 17.
268 A. Szumański: Wpływ uczestnictwa spółki kapitałowej w grupie spółek na związanie zapisem na sąd polu-
bowny dokonanym przez inną spółkę z grupy [Consequences for a company of participation in a group of compa-
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form which stays in relation to the PCC provisions regarding the power of attorney. 
Article 99 § 1 PCC provides that if the validity of a legal act requires a special form, 
the power of attorney authorizing to the performance of that act shall be granted in 
the same form269. Because the tacit conclusion of an arbitration agreement under 
Polish law is impossible, thus granting an implied authority to its conclusion would 
be impossible, too270. Therefore, even a false impression caused by the principal that 
the agent acts on their behalf is not sufficient to conclude such an agreement. On the 
other hand, accepting the fact that the arbitration agreement could be drawn up 
tacitly would open also a discussion over the implied authority in Polish law. 
The Polish Supreme Court, having relied on the previous regulations (before 
the amendments of 2005), held that an arbitration agreement could not be con-
cluded tacitly271. The requirement of a written form under a sanction of nullity was 
invoked, though it did not stem directly from the provision272. Also, the majority of 
scholars nowadays seem to accept that for the existence of an arbitration agreement, 
it is mandatory to observe one of the forms stipulated in Article 1162 § 1 PCCP. 
Nonetheless, there are also other standpoints emphasizing that non-adherence to that 
form does not have to necessarily cause its invalidity. Thus, it could be possible to 
enter into such an agreement tacitly. Such an interpretation would establish leeway 
for accepting that as well a power of attorney could be drawn up impliedly, accord-
ing to the principle of freedom of a declaration of will (Article 60 PCC). 
Summing up, without prejudice to any of the aforementioned theories, it must 
be said that an application of the concept of agency to Polish law could be extreme-
ly difficult nowadays. The institution, which is important, has been developed by 
the common law doctrine, thus its direct implementation to Polish law without any 
amendments seems impossible. Nevertheless, other solutions can be proposed. 
Under Article 1167 PCCP, a power of attorney granted by an entrepreneur to conclude 
a main contract also contains an authorization to enter into an arbitration agreement. 
This concerns only entrepreneurs and only the authorization to enter into a main 
contract and an arbitration agreement. However, this does not create on the agent’s 
side an obligation to enter into the arbitration agreement or any legal presumption 
of conclusion of such an agreement. Regarding the concepts of implied authority or 
the possibility of entering into an arbitration agreement by implied action, the con-
clusion should be that currently it would be rather impossible to adopt them in Poland, 
merely because of the prevailing opinion among courts and scholars273. Nonetheless, 
nies in the light of effectiveness of an arbitration agreement drawn up by another company belonging to the group], 
Przegląd Prawa Handlowego 2008, No. 5, p. 51.
269 A. Wiśniewski: Międzynarodowy…, op. cit., pp. 478–479.
270 S. Sołtysiński: Związanie…, op. cit., p. 19; A. Wiśniewski: Międzynarodowy…, op. cit., p. 479.
271 Judgment of the Supreme Court of 27 June 1960, 4 Cr 874/59, OSN 1962, No. 3 item 85 (Poland).
272 Judgment of the Supreme Court of 9 January 1969, I CZ 3/68, OSPiKA 1971, No. 7–8, item 139 (Po-
land).
273 T. Ereciński, K. Weitz: Sąd…, op. cit., pp. 136–137; R. Morek: Arbitraż…, op. cit., pp. 144–145.
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there is a noticeable paradigm shift regarding loosening the requirement of form of 
an arbitration agreement. It is not impossible that in the future, the strict interpreta-
tion of the provisions will change. Also, an idea of implied authority seems to be 
noticed by scholars and probably will be evolving. 
3.6. ABUSE OF CORPORATE (LEGAL) PERSONALITY  
AND ABUSE OF SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS VS VEIL PIERCING 
The most widely commented grounds for the extension of an arbitration agree-
ment to non-signatories seem to be an abuse of corporate personality and an abuse 
of substantive rights in Polish law274. The reason why the concepts are interesting 
is, first and foremost, the fact that they are in truth attempts of implementation to 
the Polish legal system institutions tantamount to veil piercing and the doctrine of 
a group of companies in a context of the extension of an arbitration agreement to 
non-signatories. 
The whole argumentation should be started with a statement that, until now, the 
jurisprudence has not recognized under Polish law the doctrines of veil piercing or 
a group of companies as bases for extending a liability for a company’s debts towards 
shareholders or companies operating in the same holding group. Relationships between 
companies inside the same group of companies or a majority ownership in a company 
could not justify liability of shareholders and parent companies for the company’s 
or subsidiary’s debts. The aforesaid rules have its roots in Article 151 § 4 of PCA275. 
According to this provision shareholders are not liable for a company’s debts. There-
fore, it would be even much harder to translate the concept to the problem of the scope 
of an arbitration agreement and its binding effect upon third parties. Apart from that, 
many provisions regulating a liability of officers (members of management boards) 
for a company’s debts do exist in Polish law. For example, provisions of PCA (Article 
299 § 1 PCA) that stipulate a liability of a member of the management board for 
a company’s debts when enforcement proceedings against the company have become 
futile276. Furthermore, some administrative provisions can be invoked as example, 
i.e. Article 106a(1) of the Protection of Competition and Consumers Act277 (hereinaf-
274 A. Wiśniewski: Międzynarodowy…, op. cit., pp. 475–478; A. Szumański: Wpływ uczestnictwa…, p. 48 
et seq.
275 A. Szumański: Wpływ uczestnictwa…, op. cit., p. 48; S. Kubsik: Odpowiedzialność wspólników (akcjona-
riuszy) spółki kapitałowej za zobowiązania spółki w stosunku do jej wierzycieli na przykładzie grupy spółek [Sha-
reholders’ liability for a company’s debts to its creditors on the example of a group of companies], Przegląd Prawa 
Handlowego 2013, No. 8, p. 50.
276 A. Kappes: Odpowiedzialność członków zarządu za zobowiązania spółki z o.o. [Liability of members of 
management board for limited liability company’s debts], Warsaw 2009, p. 53.
277 Act of 16 February 2007 — Protection of Competition and Consumers Law (Journal of Laws of 2007, No. 50, 
item 331).
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ter referred to as PCCA) that provides for monetary penalties in an amount of up 
to PLN 2,000,000 imposed on a managing person, if that person deliberately led an 
entrepreneur (company) into taking part in forbidden agreements which aim was to 
restrict the competition on the market278. 
However, a view that a traditional veil piercing as a common law doctrine could 
not be introduced to Polish legal system has evolved significantly. Currently, schol-
ars accept it that some contract or tort law institutions can be basis for shareholder’s 
liability279. First, Article 415 PCC referring simply to a tort liability must be cited280. 
Under Article 415 PCC whoever in his fault caused damage to another person shall 
be obliged to redress it. Translating that regulation into the realm of holding struc-
tures, it must be said that there is a possibility of extending the scope of a liability 
for a company’s debts to its shareholders. However, as in any other tort case, some 
specific factors must occur. These are: (1) damage related to a company’s course of 
business, (2) a shareholders’ activity including control over a company’s matters, 
(3) a direct causal relationship between factors (1) and (2)281. Both the jurisprudence 
and the judiciary emphasize that damage must be proven directly in order to extend 
the liability to shareholders282. 
Such a long introduction is intended in order to put forward a thesis that the 
problem of veil piercing in Poland is always a matter of someone’s damage. It is 
a fundamental obstacle to apply Article 415 PCC and tort liability to the problem of 
extension of an arbitration agreement to non-signatories. The fact that a dispute is 
not tried by an arbitration panel could not be deemed to be damage under Polish 
law283. Similarly, the same problem appears when analysing the issue of officers’ 
liability for a company’s debts under Article 299 PCA. In that case, liability relies 
upon debt and the creditor’s damage. Therefore, present solutions for veil piercing 
developed in Poland cannot be the grounds for extending the arbitration agreement 
to non-signatories because of the lack of damage. It is also highly questionable 
whether an arbitration agreement as a contractual construct could be extended under 
tort law provisions, regarding its contractual nature284. However, although the word-
278 M. Rządkowski: Piercing the Corporate Veil in Poland? A Comparative Perspective, Comparative Law 
Review 2015, No. 20, p. 75.
279 R. Szczepaniak: Glosa do wyroku SN z dnia 17 marca 2015 r., I PK 179/14 [Gloss on the judgment of the 
Supreme Court of 17 March 2015, I PK 179/14], Orzecznictwo Sądów Polskich 2016, No. 7–8, LEX el. 
280 T. Targosz: Odpowiedzialność wspólnika wobec wierzycieli spółki [Shareholders’ liability towards company’s 
creditors], Przegląd Prawa Handlowego 2013, No. 4 p. 27; P. Czarnecki: Odpowiedzialność pracodawcy a rozwój 
struktur holdingowych [Employer’s liability and development of holding structure], Warsaw 2014, pp. 118–119.
281 Z. Radwański, A. Olejniczak: Zobowiązania — część ogólna [Obligations — general part], Warsaw 2008, 
pp. 215–219. 
282 M. Rządkowski: Piercing…, op. cit., p. 77; judgment of the Supreme Court of 24 November 2009, V CSK 
169/09 (Poland). 
283 A. Wiśniewski: Międzynarodowy…, op. cit., p. 475; A. Szumański: Wpływ uczestnictwa…, op. cit., p. 53.
284 M. Zachariasiewicz, J. Zrałek: Czy umowa arbitrażowa rozciąga się na podmioty powiązane ze spółką 
będącą stroną tej umowy? [Can an arbitration agreement be extended to entities related to a company that is 
a party to such agreement?], ADR. Arbitraż i Mediacja 2009, No. 2, p. 175.
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ing of the New York Convention, particularly of its Article 2(1), provides that an 
arbitration agreement may concern “defined legal relationship, whether contractual 
or not”, what could possibly suggest that there is room for tort claims related to the 
container contract in arbitration, it would still depend on the scope and wording of 
the arbitration agreement itself. Therefore, such claims can arise in arbitration pro-
ceedings only if a broad and general wording of the arbitration agreement allows 
so285. They are rooted in parties’ consent, thus, regardless of their tortious nature, 
they cannot appear in arbitration without the contractual basis. Nonetheless, com-
mentators have worked out some other solutions that could be the basis for such an 
extension: abuse of legal personality and abuse of substantive rights. However, they 
are not undisputable and are a matter of a wide discussion. 
3.7. ABUSE OF CORPORATE (LEGAL) PERSONALITY,  
ABUSE OF SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS VS A GROUP  
OF COMPANIES DOCTRINE 
Article 5 PCC stipulates a general rule concerning the abuse of substantive 
rights. One cannot exercise their right in a manner which would contradict its social 
and economic purpose or the principles of social coexistence. Such an act or omis-
sion on the part of the person entitled shall not be considered the exercise of that 
right and shall not be protected286. However, that provision cannot be a sole basis 
for a claim. It can be just used for a defensive purpose287. Thus, if a claimant brings 
to court a claim which a defendant considers to be violating the principles of social 
coexistence, the defendant can raise such an objection. Nevertheless, the claimant 
cannot rely their claim on a statement that it stems from the principles of social 
coexistence. This is because the principles of social coexistence should be deemed 
to be rules of people’s behaviour, which do not have a strictly legal dimension and 
rely mainly on a moral evaluation, and are deeply rooted in a society’s mainstay288. 
Mostly, they are associated with ethics. In professional bargaining among entrepre-
neurs, loyalty, commercial integrity or good commercial practice have often been 
285 M. Moses: The Principles…, op. cit., pp. 31–32.
286 P. Machnikowski: Komentarz do art. 5 k.c. [Commentary on Article 5 PCC] [in:] E. Gniewek, P. Machni-
kowski (eds.), Kodeks…, op. cit., Legalis 2016; M. Gutowski: Komentarz do art. 5 k.c. [Commentary on Article 5 
PCC] [in:] M. Gutowski (ed.), Kodeks cywilny. Komentarz. Art. 1–44911 [Civil Code. Commentary. Articles 1–44911], 
Vol. 1, Warsaw 2016, Legalis. 
287 A. Szumański: Wpływ uczestnictwa…, op. cit., p. 57; A. Wiśniewski questions a strictly defensive nature of 
that provision because of its importance for the whole system of private law (A. Wiśniewski: Nadużycie…, op. cit., 
p. 14); E. Wętrys: Skuteczność zapisu na sąd polubowny spółki zależnej wobec spółki dominującej [Binding effect 
of arbitration agreement concluded by a subsidiary of a parent company], ADR. Arbitraż i Mediacja 2010, No. 3, 
pp. 188–189. 
288 P. Machnikowski: Komentarz do art. 5 k.c. [in:] E. Gniewek, P. Machnikowski (eds.), Kodeks…, op. cit., 
Legalis 2016.
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given as examples of such principles. On the other hand, the clause of the social and 
economic purpose concerns the purpose and use of the right. It resorts to a functio-
nal aspect of the substantive rights, where the rights are devoted to some specific use 
and mission to perform289. In the light of the extension of an arbitration agreement 
A. Wiśniewski identifies such problems in the following manner. For example, an 
entity that should be bound by an arbitration agreement because of their active role 
in negotiating and concluding a main contract which finally has been concluded by 
its subsidiary avoids a binding effect of the arbitration agreement plainly by misus-
ing the subsidiary290. An obstacle to adoption of such an idea is a defensive role of 
Article 5 PCC291. Resultantly, it cannot be a sole justification for the competence 
of an arbitral panel for dispute resolution. Commentators are rather sceptical about 
that concept292. Moreover, requirements of the form for the arbitration agreement 
could be also a potential obstacle. However, a pending discussion over that matter, 
globalisation process and attempts to break the rule of a defensive nature of Article 5 
PCC, can indicate that the problem of the abuse of substantive rights as the basis for 
extension of the scope of an arbitration agreement will evolve. Consequently, such 
a paradigm shift may, in the near future, cause that not only formal parties but 
also “less obvious” ones will be bound by an arbitration agreement. Nevertheless, 
the problem still seems to be unexplored and requires further in-depth analysis in 
Poland293. 
The abuse of corporate (legal) personality is often treated as a subcategory of 
the abuse of substantive rights. It is nothing else than a reflection of veil piercing 
and attempt at applying the doctrine to Polish law294. As scholars notice, the abuse 
of corporate personality means that a subsidiary is misused by real decision makers. 
Also there must be some element of unfairness or injustice295. Nevertheless, until 
now Polish legislature has not created legal aids that could extend the arbitration 
agreement to non-signatories under that legal institution. Prima facie, it also seems 
to have a lot in common with the problem of a group of companies and, although it 
has never been accepted in Poland, lawyers notice its existence and need for regula-
tion of that concept296. It is natural that the purpose of a group of companies is to 
spread and divide a business risk among affiliates operating inside one holding group. 
289 Ibidem. 
290 A. Wiśniewski: Międzynarodowy…, op. cit., p. 477.
291 A. Szumański: Wpływ uczestnictwa…, op. cit., p. 57.
292 M. Tomaszewski [in:] A. Szumański (ed.), Arbitraż…, op. cit., p. 374; A. Szumański: Wpływ uczestnictwa…, 
op. cit., p. 57.
293 M. Tomaszewski [in:] A. Szumański (ed.), Arbitraż…, op. cit., p. 374.
294 Ibidem; A. Zbiegień-Turzańska: Komentarz do art. 5 k.c. [Commentary on Article 5 PCC] [in:] K. Osajda 
(ed.), Kodeks…, op. cit., Legalis. 
295 A. Wiśniewski: Międzynarodowy…, op. cit., p. 478; A. Szumański: Wpływ uczestnictwa…, op. cit., p. 57.
296 A. Szumański: Spór wokół roli interesu grupy spółek i jego relacji w szczególności do interesu własnego 
spółki uczestniczącej w grupie [Dispute over the role of a group interest and its relation to the sole interest of 
a company belonging to the group], Przegląd Prawa Handlowego 2010, No. 5, pp. 9–17.
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Commentators put forward that the existence of a group of companies requires: 
(1) two or more companies; (2) relationship of domination and subsidiarity among 
them; (3) a common interest of a group as a whole297. Some courts in Poland have 
started recognizing the group interest as a factor justifying business decisions made 
by decision makers, even if it violates a single interest of a subsidiary to some ex-
tent298. In terms of the extension of an arbitration agreement, the concept still seems 
to be new. According to some scholars, a binding effect of the arbitration agreement 
to non-signatories under the doctrine of a group of companies would not necessar-
ily require the negative consequences (mostly some damage) or an element of un-
fairness, but rather strong relations among companies, e.g. proven by the performance 
of a main contract299. Regardless of the aforesaid comments, under present statu-
tory measures in Poland it is impossible to extend the scope of an arbitration agree-
ment to other affiliates belonging to the holding group that are non-signatories to 
the arbitration agreement300. The tenet is, however, open and demands more detailed 
deliberation. 
4. POTENTIAL THREATS AND OBSTACLES TO EXTENSION  
OF AN ARBITRATION AGREEMENT TO NON-SIGNATORIES  
UNDER POLISH LAW
The author hereof would like to draw attention to various obstacles that could 
jeopardize the application of the concept of the extension of an arbitration agreement 
to non-signatories under Polish law. First, it must be taken into consideration 
whether such an extension would not violate a third person’s constitutional right to 
court301. Second, it must be considered whether the extension of an arbitration agree-
ment to a third party does not breach requirements of the form of the arbitration 
agreement. Furthermore, it should be taken into account, whether binding non-sig-
natories with an arbitration agreement and their participation in arbitration proceed-
ings do not cause a voidability of an arbitral award. In some situations, an uncon-
trolled extension of an arbitration agreement can effect that the arbitral award issued 
during arbitration commenced on the basis of such an agreement could be set aside 
or not recognized in some jurisdictions. 
297 A. Szumański: Grupy spółek [Groups of companies] [in:] S. Sołtysiński (ed.), System Prawa Prywatnego 
[System of Private Law], Vol. 17a, Warsaw 2011, p. 677; S. Sołtysiński: Związanie…, op. cit., p. 15.
298 Judgment of the Appellate Court in Katowice of 3 December 2012, V ACa 702/12 (Poland); Judgment of 
the Appellate Court in Szczecin of 6 May 2009, II Aka 142/08 (Poland).
299 A. Wiśniewski: Międzynarodowy…, op. cit., p. 488.
300 M. Pacocha: Przebicie zasłony korporacyjnej a związanie zapisem na sąd polubowny [Veil piercing and 
binding effect of arbitration agreement], Przegląd Prawa Handlowego 2017, No. 6, p. 58.
301 S. Sołtysiński: Związanie…, op. cit., p. 21.
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At the beginning, the issue that should be analysed is whether arbitration as 
one of methods of dispute resolution pursues a constitutional right to court. Accord-
ing to Article 45(1) of the Polish Constitution, everyone shall have the right to a fair 
and public hearing of their case, without undue delay, before a competent, impartial 
and independent court. In addition, this provision stays in close relationship with 
another one of Article 175(1) of the Polish Constitution which sets forth that the 
administration of justice in the Republic of Poland shall be provided by the Supreme 
Court, common courts, administrative courts and military courts. Resultantly, the 
constitutional provisions do not mention anything about voluntarily established 
private institutions (private courts) and arbitration panels. In Poland, the right to 
court has been understood as everyone’s right to defend their substantive rights in 
court proceedings that provide some procedural guarantees. Scholars list four ele-
ments of the right to court: (1) access to a court; (2) the features of bodies which 
handle disputes are the same as in the case of state courts; (3) observance of proper 
procedure; (4) effectiveness and enforceability of court decisions302. It is clear that 
arbitration does not have all of the aforesaid features303. For example, it is hard to 
acknowledge that an arbitration panel would meet all requirements as set up for state 
courts regarding judges’ experience and competence304. Furthermore, regulations 
concerning the procedure before an arbitration panel/arbitrator depend on parties’ 
consent. They are not generally applicable legal provisions. On the other hand, the 
grounds for sorting out the dispute by means of arbitration is a procedural agree-
ment- — an arbitration agreement which by definition should be voluntary and which 
envisages parties’ consent. Some commentators claim that up to some extent parties 
to an arbitration agreement can waive their rights stemming from Article 45 of the 
Polish Constitution in the aforesaid scope305.
Theorists (e.g. B. Banaszak) do not see a conflict between state courts and 
other bodies, regardless of whether public or private, whose purpose is to resolve 
disputes. Their existence does not exclude the right to court306. The idea of arbitra-
tion, as well as other ADRs, relies upon parties’ consent. There is a unanimous 
302 J. Tarno [in:] R. Hauser, Z. Niewiadomski, A. Wróbel (eds.), Sądowa kontrola administracji publicznej. 
System Prawa Administracyjnego [Judicial supervision over the public administration. Administrative Law System], 
Vol. 10, Warsaw 2016, p. 217; M. Wyrzykowski, M. Ziółkowski [in:] R. Hauser, Z. Niewiadomski, A. Wróbel (eds.), 
Konstytucyjne zasady prawa i ich znaczenie dla interpretacji zasad ogólnych prawa i postępowania administra-
cyjnego. System Prawa Administracyjnego [Constitutional principles of law and their impact on the interpretation 
of general principles of administrative law and administrative procedure. Administrative Law System], Vol. 2, 
Warsaw 2012, pp. 25–26. 
303 T. Ereciński, K. Weitz: Sąd…, op. cit., pp. 16–17.
304 Ł. Błaszczak, M. Ludwik: Sądownictwo…, op. cit., pp. 54–55; P. Lalive: Transnational…, op. cit., pp. 269–271.
305 T. Grzegorczyk, K. Weitz: Komentarz do art. 45 Konstytucji RP [Commentary on Article 45 of the Polish 
Constitution] [in:] M. Safjan, L. Bosek (eds.), Konstytucja RP. Komentarz do art. 1–86 [Polish Constitution. Com-
mentary on Articles 1–86], Vol. 1, Warsaw 2016, Legalis.
306 B. Banaszak: Komentarz do art. 45 Konstytucji RP [Commentary on Article 45 of the Polish Constitution] 
[in:] B. Banaszak (ed.), Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Komentarz [Constitution of the Republic of Poland. 
Commentary], Warsaw 2012, Legalis.
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standpoint that arbitration itself does not collide with the constitutional right to court. 
Nevertheless, the justifications for such a statement are various. Some argue that 
arbitration does not undermine the right to court because parties voluntarily waive 
that right through an agreement or because arbitral awards are scrutinized by a state 
court at the stage of recognition or enforcement and the regulations do not exclude 
supervision over the arbitration by state courts (A. Deryng)307. Also R. Morek em-
phasizes that the arbitration does not violate the right to court, which does not have 
to be pursued exclusively by state courts, but could be also before an alternative 
forum308. A. Wiśniewski emphasizes that the right to court can be limited under 
Article 31(3) of the Polish Constitution which stipulates that any limitation on the 
exercise of constitutional freedoms and rights may be imposed only by statute, and 
only when necessary in a democratic state for the protection of its security or public 
order, or to protect the natural environment, health or public morals, or the freedoms 
and rights of other persons309. Therefore, protection of individuals’ freedoms is sup-
posed to be a justifying factor. It is worth noting at this point that there is a clash of 
some interests here: on the one hand, there is constitutional freedom that enables 
persons to waive some of their certain rights through an arbitration agreement, and 
on the other hand, a universal right to court. A. Wiśniewski holds that an opportu-
nity of referring the disputes between parties to arbitration on a contractual basis is 
justified by a necessary limitation on their right to court310. The freedom of the in-
dividual as another constitutional value (Article 5 of the Polish Constitution) should 
be the prevailing one. Some other theorists point out that the freedom of individuals 
is confined to the arbitration agreement and ends at the stage when arbitration pro-
ceedings have started to be pending, because arbitral award cannot be treated as 
a part of the arbitration agreement311. Yet, a purpose hereof is not to decide which 
of the aforementioned concepts relating to the arbitration and the constitutional right 
to court should prevail. Thus, the author shall be content with a thesis, which is 
actually undisputable, that arbitration does not collide with values resulting from 
the Polish Constitution and that stem partially from a voluntary decision made by 
the parties to the arbitration agreement and through it. Moreover, regarding a judg-
ment rendered by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Pechstein case 
of 2018312, however specifically referring to sports arbitration and CAS (Court of 
Arbitration for Sport), some remarks can be made on the relation between the arbi-
tration and Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). In 
307 A. Deryng: Sąd polubowny a realizacja konstytucyjnej zasady prawa do sądu [Arbitration and constitutio-
nal right to court], ADR. Arbitraż i Mediacja 2009, No. 1, p. 53.
308 R. Morek: ADR — Alternatywne metody rozwiązywania sporów w sprawach gospodarczych [ADR — 
Alternative dispute resolution methods in commercial disputes], Warsaw 2004, pp. 49–53. 
309 A. Wiśniewski: Międzynarodowy…, op. cit., p. 69.
310 Ibidem, pp. 69–71.
311 Ł. Błaszczak: Wyrok…, op. cit., p. 79.
312 Mutu and Pechstein v. Switzerland, judgment of 2 October 2018, ECHR 324 (2018).
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this case ECtHR held that if arbitration is not entirely consensual (the Court deter-
mined that the claimant’s consent had not been freely given), then it must meet the 
standards set forth in Article 6(1) ECHR providing a right to a fair trial, inter alia, 
the right to a public hearing if a party demands so. Therefore, the consensual nature 
of arbitration is crucial, and if it is limited, then a higher standard of proceedings 
must be met — tantamount to those provided for in Article 6(1) ECHR.
In the context of this article, one should consider whether the adoption in 
Polish law of the idea of  extending an arbitration agreement to persons that have 
not signed such an agreement and have not covered it by their will does not inter-
fere with these persons’ constitutional right to court. Regarding the aforementioned 
grounds for the extension of the scope of an arbitration agreement under Polish 
law, the following should be analysed: a universal and a singular legal succession, 
an agreement for a performance to a third person, an abuse of substantive rights 
or an abuse of corporate personality. It seems that under legal succession, both 
singular and universal, such collision between them and the constitutional right 
to court would not occur. It would be the same in the case of a general transfer of 
contractual rights and obligations. First of all, one cannot lose sight of the fact that 
grounds of such as an assignment or an assumption of debt are consensual by 
nature, mostly incorporated in some contract. Their purpose is to grant a successor 
with the legal status of the predecessor with all consequences which follow. An 
arbitration agreement itself does not deprive an individual of a right to court en-
tirely but always in relation to some particular contractual relationship313. In 
a situation where a successor voluntarily replaces a party to a contract, such 
a succession cannot be selective. It would be undesirable if a legal successor gained 
benefits from the succession of the contract without burdens resulting therefrom. 
Under these circumstances an arbitration agreement is, regardless of its autonomy, 
an element functionally related to the main contract. Such deliberation were also 
analysed by the Polish Supreme Court. In its resolution, the Supreme Court held 
that an uncontrolled spillover of the scope of an arbitration agreement to third 
party can violate their right to court. The Supreme Court emphasized that depend-
ing on whether the third party is replacing a signatory or acting independently 
(i.e. as a jointly and severally liable party), will or will not be a party to the arbi-
tration agreement. Thus, the arbitration agreement is binding upon legal successors 
and does not encompass a jointly and severally liable person314. However, the issue 
seems to be more complex in the case of a third party for whose benefit contract 
should be performed.
As it has been presented above, in the contract for a performance to a third 
party such a third party can demand the direct performance of the contract from 
313 T. Ereciński, K. Weitz: Sąd…, op. cit., pp. 21–22.
314 Resolution of the Supreme Court of 13 July 2011, III CZP 36/11 (Poland). 
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a debtor. The consideration (performance) goes in one direction. As it has already 
been explained, if a third party launched a claim before a state court, a debtor could 
invoke an arbitration agreement. At this point, there is a question of whether the 
third party for whose benefit the contract should be performed is not deprived of 
a right to court. Answering this question, firstly a source of the third party’s claim 
should be analysed. Such a claim results from the main contract between the debtor 
and the creditor. If both parties to the main contract decided to resolve all disputes 
related to the main contract by arbitration, the third party who did not participate in 
the conclusion of the contract, when referring dispute to a state court, would take 
a step for which the parties did not agree. The fact that the third party gains benefits 
from the contract does not entitle them to change its content. In this case, the arbitra-
tion agreement is related to the main contract — it is one of its features. Only parties 
to that contract can change its content (until the third party notifies one of the par-
ties of the intent of accepting performance). Mostly, if the contract is performed for 
the benefit of the third party, such a stipulation has its origins in another contrac-
tual relationship, between the creditor and the third party. They can both decide in 
a separate agreement that they want to sort out their disputes through arbitration or 
litigation. However, such an agreement must not worsen a position of the debtor. 
Scholars unanimously acknowledge that the third party is bound by an arbitration 
agreement. 
The whole issue gets complicated in the case of an extension of an arbitration 
agreement under the doctrines of an abuse of substantive rights or an abuse of cor-
porate personality. As stated beforehand, uncontrolled extension of the arbitration 
agreement to non-signatories could violate their right to court. In this case, the real 
intent of signatories and non-signatories must always be carefully determined to not 
make the participation in arbitration coercive. Irrespective of whether it is interna-
tional or domestic arbitration, consent to arbitrate is crucial. In the light of the 
concepts presented herein, it would be impossible under Polish law to bind non-
signatories with an arbitration agreement under the theories of the abuse of substan-
tive rights or the abuse of corporate personality. Therefore, the discussion over the 
potential breach of the constitutional right to court based on such concepts is 
merely hypothetical. 
When discussing the problem of the extension of an arbitration agreement 
theorists rarely pay attention to the form of the arbitration agreement, especially 
when it is mandatory in some jurisdictions to draw up the arbitration agreement in 
writing. Article 1162 § 1 PCCP requires one to conclude an arbitration agreement 
in writing, regardless of whether it is a separate agreement or an arbitration clause. 
The requirement has been relaxed by Article 1162 § 2 PCCP which provides that 
the form is observed also when it is contained in documents exchanged by parties 
or in statements sent by means of telecommunication which provide a record of the 
agreement. There is a prevailing opinion among scholars that the provision concerns 
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a written form or forms, tantamount e.g. to electronic form. Hence, it is not a tradi-
tional written form. Such an interpretation can be supported by, inter alia, interna-
tional regulations, especially by the New York Convention315 regarding the form of 
an arbitration agreement. According to Article 2(2) New York Convention, “agree-
ment in writing” means an arbitral clause in a contract or an arbitration agreement, 
signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams. Also, the 
provisions of the European Convention316 seem to be less strict. Article 1(2)(a) pro-
vides that an arbitration agreement shall mean either an arbitral clause in a contract 
or an arbitration agreement being signed by the parties, or contained in an exchange 
of letters, telegrams, or in a communication by teleprinter and, in relations between 
states whose laws do not require that an arbitration agreement be made in writing, 
any arbitration agreement concluded in the form authorised by these laws. The PCCP 
provisions regulating that construct should be construed, on one hand as a manda-
tory form, and on the other hand as a less stricter than typical written form to be 
understood as signed by the parties. 
In Poland, both the judiciary and jurisprudence take a position that an arbitra-
tion agreement cannot be concluded tacitly without clear manifestation of the parties’ 
intent expressed in the form provided for in Article 1162 PCCP317. There is also 
a prevailing opinion that the arbitration agreement is null and void in the case of 
lack of such a form. Additionally, the existence of an arbitration agreement cannot 
be proved, e.g. by means of witnesses’ statements. It is rather important, because 
when dealing with the extension of an arbitration agreement to non-signatories, 
a problem of form seems to be passed over. The fact that currently an arbitration 
agreement cannot be concluded by implied action, i.e. by performance of the main 
contract, actually settles that in Poland there is also no room for implied authority 
or implied consent as it is in the domain of international lex mercatoria. Such 
a problem would not exist in the case of a legal succession or a contract for perform-
ance to a third party. In the event of a legal succession, the transfer of rights stemming 
from the contract often takes place by means of a document. For example, in the 
case of the assumption of debt, the written form is mandatory otherwise acquisition 
is null and void (Article 522 PCC). Furthermore, in a contract for performance to 
a third party, the content incorporated in the main contract (including an arbitration 
clause) determines the parties to the contract and a person who is the beneficiary. 
Nonetheless, the grounds such as an abuse of substantive rights or an abuse of cor-
porate legal personality may result in the personal scope of an arbitration clause 
being extended beyond the written framework of the contract. Therefore, extending 
an arbitration agreement to non-signatories without the strictly specified contrac-
315 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 10 June 
1958 (New York Convention).
316 European (Geneva) Convention on International Commercial Arbitration of 21 April 1961. 
317 A. Budniak: Forma zapisu…, op. cit., Legalis el.
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tual basis can contravene provisions on requirements as to the form. On the other 
hand, it is worth considering whether the fact that the main contract with an arbitra-
tion agreement has been concluded in writing and after conclusion other entities join 
the contract, e.g. impliedly, does not meet the requirements as to the form. In such 
a situation an arbitration agreement exists in the written form. Only after its conclu-
sion, does a question arise about the personal scope of the agreement and the parties 
to the agreement, not formal but also real ones (that resembles the aforesaid Swiss 
approach to that matter)318. Yet, such deliberation falls outside the scope hereof. The 
author just wants to put forward the issue roughly to emphasize that the implemen-
tation of the concept could be highly uncertain due to the requirements of form of 
an arbitration agreement. 
Ł. Błaszczak and M. Ludwik highlight that consequences of the extension of 
an arbitration agreement to non-signatories under Polish present statutory measures 
triggers a risk that a person who has participated in arbitration proceedings against 
their will could file a complaint and demand to set aside the arbitral award claiming 
that there has been no arbitration agreement that covered their dispute (Article 1206 
§ 1 paras. 1 and 2 PCCP)319. The importance of consent to arbitration, not only of 
actual parties but also real, less-obvious, ones has been emphasized once more. 
Under the presented theories, the legal effectiveness and scope of arbitral award 
after the extension of an arbitration agreement also seem to be problematic320. The 
situation could get even more complicated in the case of enforcement of such 
an award, if a Polish court determined that the award was rendered on the basis 
of an arbitration agreement that had been involuntarily extended to third parties 
(e.g. a group member). Under Article V(2)(b) New York Convention, the court might 
resort to the violation of public policy understood as a universally recognized right 
to a court and a fair trial when refusing the enforcement of an award. Nevertheless, 
the problem requires a deeper analysis. 
5. CONCLUSION
The practice of international commercial arbitration has worked out the con-
cept of extension of an arbitration agreement to entities who have not originally 
signed such an agreement. The scope of the arbitration agreement would encom-
pass entities that are to some extent related to the main contract or one of the 
318 Judgment of 16 October 2003, DFT 129 III 727 (Swiss Federal Tribunal); J.F. Poudret, S. Besson: Com-
parative…, p. 221 with some critical remarks on that solution. 
319 A. Szumański: Zakres podmiotowy… [in:] P. Nowaczyk, S. Pieckowski, J. Poczobut, A. Szumański, 
A. Tynel (eds.), Międzynarodowy i krajowy arbitraż…, op. cit., p. 234; Ł. Błaszczak, M. Ludwik: Sądownictwo…, 
op. cit., p. 278; K. Potrzobowski, W. Żywicki: Sądownictwo polubowne. Komentarz dla potrzeb praktyki [Arbitra-
tion. Commentary for legal practitioners], Warsaw 1961, p. 98.
320 Ł. Błaszczak: Wyrok…, op. cit., pp. 425–426.
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parties. The grounds for such an extension have been invoked as follows: an 
agency, an implied consent, a third party beneficiary, an equitable estoppel, a veil 
piercing or a group of companies. Scholars cite also other grounds, e.g. a legal 
succession, an assignment or an acquisition of debt. The agency, implied consent 
or third party beneficiary are contractual constructs, and they are deeply rooted in 
common law systems. Throughout different jurisdictions, courts are keener on 
extending arbitration agreements when a third party demands so. In the opposite 
way, where an actual party to the contract (a signatory) requires such an extension 
to a non-signatory, the chances are smaller. In this case, the court would likely 
check whether the third party has gained direct benefits from the contract. The veil 
piercing doctrine is associated with widely understood business organizations or 
corporate law. Practitioners point out that in the case of veil piercing, it is neces-
sary to determine that major shareholders performed absolute control over 
a company when it entered into or was performing the contract and that the fraud 
or any other injustice or unfairness were involved. The equitable estoppel and the 
veil piercing doctrine are more focused on equity and fairness than parties’ consent 
to arbitration. The doctrine of a group of companies, deeply analysed in case of 
Dow Chemical, enables one to span the scope of an arbitration agreement and, 
consequently, to introduce non-signatories to arbitration proceedings. The reason 
for the extension was the fact that companies belonging to the same group of 
companies were interrelated and took part in the contract’s performance. Further-
more, in the Dow Chemical case the non-signatories were those who demanded 
participation in arbitration proceedings. Nevertheless, the group of companies 
doctrine has been deemed as consent-based theory with the main goal of determin-
ing the parties’ intent through their conduct. Courts would likely extend an arbitra-
tion agreement to a non-signatory who demands so. Signatories should foresee 
that they would be a party to some arbitration proceedings, what is not so obvious 
in the case of non-signatories. Arbitration must still rely upon consent and forcing 
an outsider to participate in the arbitration without their will would miss the point. 
Contrarily, there is a discussion pending on the role of consent in international 
commercial arbitration. Some authors would like to minimize its role, some think 
that there is a need for a modern approach to consent in international arbitration, 
more focused on commercial reality. 
In Poland, the tenet of the extension of an arbitration agreement to non-signa-
tories still seems to be unexplored. Scholars and the judiciary agree that such an 
extension takes place in the case of a legal succession, both universal (transformation 
of a company or a succession by inheritance) and singular (e.g. an assignment, an 
acquisition of debt) or subrogation. Additionally, there is no doubt that a third person 
for whose benefit a contract is performed is bound by the arbitration clause in-
cluded in that contract. Moreover, by the prevailing opinion of commentators and 
courts, the arbitration agreement does not bind sureties, guarantors and persons 
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jointly and severally liable, what can raise some questions at to correctness of that 
solution, posed by the author in this article. In corporate disputes, an arbitration 
clause in a partnership agreement or articles of association concerning disputes aris-
ing out of the corporate relationship is binding upon the partnership or corporation 
and its partners or shareholders. It refers to all partners and shareholders, former and 
present ones. However, it does not concern corporate bodies and members of the 
management board, what has been repeatedly criticized. Also, implied authority as 
a reflection of common law agency, would not be grounds for extending the arbitra-
tion agreement to non-signatories in Poland. Furthermore, Polish law requires for 
arbitration agreement to be compiled in a written form, though with a possibility of 
replacing it by, e.g. statements given by means of electronic communication. The 
extension of the arbitration agreement to a non-signatory raises a question of 
whether it does not violate requirements as to the form of the arbitration agreement, 
and consequently cause its invalidity. 
Moreover, the extension of the arbitration agreement would not be possible 
under provisions on tort liability (Article 415 PCC) to real decision-makers or 
shareholders because of the lack of traditionally understood damage. Non-submis-
sion of a case to arbitration cannot be deemed to be damage in Polish law. Further-
more, the contractual nature of the arbitration agreement could potentially prevent 
its extension based on provisions referring to tort liability, however, it would depend 
on the wording of an arbitration clause. Instead of veil piercing or the group of 
companies doctrine, some practitioners propose to resort to the abuse of substantive 
rights (Article 5 PCC) or the abuse of corporate legal personality. Such theories 
should be analysed carefully. Although they have been supported by some theorists, 
they still cannot be treated as the grounds for the extension of an arbitration agree-
ment to third persons in Poland. Nevertheless, the current status of the study on that 
topic is unsatisfactory. In addition, the author’s standpoint is that the application of 
the concepts worked out by international practice to Polish legal system might be 
highly disputable for the following reasons. First, in the case of extending of an 
arbitration clause to non-signatories, there is a serious question of compliance of 
such a solution with the constitutional right to court. Especially, when a third person 
has no interest in participating in arbitration proceedings. Eventually, a too liberal 
attitude towards that matter could challenge the validity of an arbitral award or, as 
a public policy in Poland, would lead to the refusal of enforcement of a foreign 
arbitral award rendered on a basis of the extended arbitration agreement. Thus, it is 
worth considering whether such an extension should not occur on a third party’s 
demand in the first place, to analyse their real intent, and then on demand of actual 
parties to the arbitration agreement. Nonetheless, such de lege ferenda proposal 
needs further in-depth analysis. And second, such an extension could violate require-
ments as to the form of the arbitration agreement which, as many commentators 
believe, are mandatory.
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MICHAŁ RZĄDKOWSKI, LL.M.
ARBITRATION AGREEMENT AND NON-SIGNATORIES.  
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE AND POLISH SOLUTIONS
S u m m a r y
The article touches on the problem of an extension of an arbitration agreement towards 
non-signatories. Firstly, the author describes and categorizes grounds for such extension 
in the comparative perspective taking into account opinions formulated by international 
practitioners, court decisions and arbitral awards. Secondly, the author evaluates them through 
a perspective of a possibility of their application to the Polish legal system. The author 
conducts an analysis of the grounds for the extension of arbitration agreement towards non-
-signatories under the current Polish statutory measures and tries to compare them to those 
existing in international context. Moreover, the article concerns potential obstacles and threats 
related to an adoption of these grounds in Polish law. 
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